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Chapter 1 
In my thesis, I will be presenting some empirical findings on the development of socio-moral 
evaluations in infants and preschoolers, this subject has had a long trajectory in the field of 
psychology in the last decades. For this reason, it is important that I describe some of the classical 
theories and recent literature that explains the development of morality.  More specifically, I studied 
next to my collaborators: the emerging capacity of ‘the sense of fairness’, ‘harm’, ‘prosocial helping 
behaviors’, and the ‘logic of merit’. Our research supports a nativist viewpoint where the origins of 
justice, fairness, and equity are of an innate foundation rather than an acquired one. 
In the first part of my thesis, I will give an overview of the literature about my topic. Later, I 
will conclude this introductory part with the presentation of our empirical findings and finally, a 
general discussion.   
 
1.1 Moral development 
The aim of this first part of my thesis is to address two relevant issues to the development of 
morality. The first issue is more about epistemology (in the constructed-developmental approach, 
like social domain) than about development, having to do with the conceptualizations of morality as 
a whole. The issue of conceptualization requires knowing how to illustrate the psychological 
functioning of humans, in other words, how perspectives on psychological functioning lead to 
conceptualizations of morality and its acquisition by children. The second issue describes the 
developmental side (contrasting constructed-developmental approaches with deterministic ones), 
having to do with how children think about morality, which includes thinking in social terms. In 
these circumstances, I will reflect what literature reveals about processes of development in the 
moral domain. 
  
11 
 
The approach often referred to as social domain approach (as described in Turiel, 2006, 
Killen & Smetana, 2015), is based on the ways children, adolescents, and adults form distinct and 
abstract types of thinking in the moral, social-conventional, and personal domains. Research on 
these domains suggests that morality rests on core judgments about welfare, justice and rights that 
are considered important and necessary and that people struggle with moral issues in their social 
lives. Furthermore, in the social domain approach it is suggested that the development of morality 
happens through children’s reciprocal interactions with adults and peers leading to social 
arrangements and cultural practices that make them aware of injustices and inequalities.  
The approach outlined until now about morality and its development diverges with other 
psychological perceptions suggesting deterministic conceptions of morality and its acquisition 
based on several factors, including genetics, built-in intuitions, conscience, traits of character or 
acquired virtues and internalized parental authority and societal values/norms/rules, these nurturing 
certain ideas, emotions, or intuitions (Killen & Smetana, 2015).   
Some theoretical approaches represent an important division in psychological explanations 
of morality and its development. These important divisions are whether morality is: a) part of the 
ways people actively deal with right and wrong and good and bad in their social relationships (see 
Turiel, 2008), or b) determined by psychological mechanisms, such as fixed biological dispositions. 
Each of these perspectives provides different explanations of processes of moral development. One 
side of the division explains the development as involving the construction of judgements about 
right or wrong through children’s social experience and interactions. The other, nativist side, sees 
the basic characters of morality innate instead acquired. In the first case, the interactions drive the 
moral development and only capacities to acquire morality are innate, i.e., the biology part only 
involves the cognitive and other capacities to acquire morality, and what morality is determined by 
the social surroundings. In the latter case, the innate morality manifests itself in the interactions, i.e., 
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morality is "programmed", but its manifestation might need triggering: that is, the predisposition for 
morality becomes moral behavior only when the child is exposed to the kind of situations where 
morality is needed. Both cases are compatible with the idea that there are stages in moral 
development, but only the latter predicts high degree of universality in development. Thus, moral 
development involves both divisions as necessary components, i.e., both the social environment and 
biology are involved in the developmental process.  
The first side of the division on whether the development of morality is based on social 
experiences and interactions goes back to classical structural developmental theories (Piaget, 1932; 
Kohlberg, 1981). Both Piaget and Kohlberg (as described in Turiel, 2006) have in common that 
what is considered the development of moral judgment is dependent from cognitive development 
and the following steps is an obligatory route that are traced by the laws of development. According 
to Piaget (1932), the development of the sense of justice is a primary aspect from a transition from a 
heteronomous morality to an autonomous morality, and is closely linked to experiences with the 
peer group. Piaget has outlined the development of the understanding of the two classical notions of 
justice: distributive and retributive. Distributive justice seeks to promote an equitable distribution of 
common resources, that is, a materially fair society, where there is no room for jealousy or 
resentment of others’ fortunes. Retributive justice promotes the distribution of sanctions and 
rewards for one’s actions: the crime deserves an equivalent penalty and the good deed a 
corresponding prize. Retributive justice occurs early, has a more individual nature and it takes into 
account the relationship between sanctions and rewards. The understanding of distributive justice 
seems to emerge later in development, when the autonomous morality evolves: it has a social nature 
and is dominated at the beginning by a principle of equality and then equity. Piaget also 
investigated the notion of expiatory punishment that dominates the stage of moral realism: it is 
related to the idea that every transgression must follow a severe punishment, which appears as a 
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natural and necessary consequence of a punitive act and that in any case will be from somewhere, 
maybe not from the people but from natural facts (immanent justice). Following the cooperation 
and experience of reciprocal respect, the expiatory character of a sanction is deleted and the 
repairing aspect or reciprocal obligation prevails. This reciprocity initially a simplistic character 
gradually becomes more universal. Moreover, Piaget found that explicit moral reasoning, expressed 
verbally by the child, is a kind of awareness of morality, supported by cognitive abilities that have 
developed. 
Kohlberg (1971, also described in Turiel 2006) extended and completed Piaget’s theory, in 
which he shares a developmental stages, the central consideration of the cognitive processes and the 
prevailing interest for moral thought and action. The extension consists of an enunciation of stages 
finishing at an adult age and a precise definition of the criteria that consents to place the various 
forms of moral judgment in the subsequent stages. Kohlberg claims that it is crucial for the 
parallelism between the stages of intellectual development and the development of moral thought. 
The possession of   cognitive skills in a stage is necessary but not sufficient because the relevant 
features of moral judgment are present. Using interviews similar to those used by Piaget, Kohlberg 
proposed to the subjects of moral dilemmas, represented by events in which the main character can 
take different decisions; subsequently he outlined a series of stages of moral development from 
childhood to adulthood. The notion of the stage is closely linked to that of Piaget: the development 
of the stages goes from a lower level to a higher level and every individual passes from one stage to 
the next (the principle of invariance of the sequence). The sequence devised by Kohlberg provides 
three levels of moral judgment (pre-conventional, conventional, post-conventional), each of which 
is divided into 2 stages. 
The theories discussed above have described moral development as a process of increasing 
differentiation between moral and non-moral concepts, such as convention, prudence and 
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pragmatics, where morality emerges from the overall developmental process. Social domain theory 
departs from this view by proposing that the moral, conventional and psychological domains are 
separate, self-regulating developmental systems that are not developmentally ordered (see Turiel, 
1998; Smetana, 1997; Tisak, 1995; Nucci, 1996). Rather, they are assumed to co-exist from an early 
age although concepts in each domain are seen to change with age. The results of numerous 
observational studies (Nucci & Nucci, 1982; Smetana,1989, 1997, as cited by Turiel 2006) are 
consistent with Piaget in indicating that children’s conflicts over moral issues such as object 
possession, like taking a toy or not sharing a toy, rights, turn-taking, hurting, aggression, teasing or 
name calling and unkindness (all moral issues) do occur mainly with peers.  
Literature described so far shares the viewpoint that claims that the emergence of distinct 
domains of judgement in early life and their maintenance into adulthood does not mean that such 
domains of judgment are innate or that changes do not occur with age. As Piaget (1932, as 
described in Turiel, 2006) suggested, the existence of ways of thinking and acting at 3 or 4 years of 
age cannot mean that they have an innate or instinctual source, since they already have experienced 
many social interactions, including influences from their interactions with adults and peers. 
So far, I have highlighted some literature on the approach that moral development is 
acquired by social interactions, now I will consider the other part of the division in psychological 
explanations of morality and its development that proposes that morality is based on fixed 
biological dispositions or is innateness. This is an important topic for me since I base a great part of 
my experimental work on this nativist viewpoint that humans possess innate or instinctual 
predispositions. 
In developmental psychology over the last decades, findings based on looking time methods 
set off a revolution in how we think about the minds of infants. In the beginning, studies used 
  
15 
 
methods to emphasize on the early knowledge of physical objects ( as described in Killen & 
Smetana, 2015), suggesting that children consider objects larger than adults do, masses that move as 
elements, that are solid and subject to gravity, and move in continuous paths through space and time 
(see Baillargeon, 1987, study with balls). Other studies have found that infants appreciate that 
individuals have goals revealing rich social understanding (Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 
1995) and then understand that other individuals have false beliefs (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). 
These findings make it plausible that some basic moral abilities will also be present in infants; 
therefore, there is no reason to think that it is more problematic for humans to have innate moral 
capacities than to have innate folk-psychological capacities. Furthermore, if there is an evolutionary 
need for them both, and there is, since we are social beings, then it is proper to study this hypothesis 
(that is, that there are innate moral abilities). And these studies (among others) provide empirical 
evidence for this hypothesis to be true. 
There are several moral emotions, including guilt, shame, gratitude and anger, but most 
developmental research has focused on its compassion or caring for other people (see Killen & 
Smetana, 2014). Studies on infants just a few months old find that they become distressed and cry 
when hearing the cry of another baby (Sagi & Hoffman, 1976). Currently, research finds that these 
reactions are not due to responses to aversive noises or when hearing the sound of their own cry by 
recordings, they do not cry as much (Dondi, Simion, & Caltran, 1999). There are other studies on 
emotional concern and engagement in prosocial acts in 1-year-olds (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, 
Wagner, & Chapman, 1992; Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, & Emde, 1992, see Killen & Smetana, 2015 
for review); these infants often soothe individuals in situations where their mother or an 
experimenter hurts themselves. Furthermore, another study on 18-month-olds found that they are 
able to willingly give assistance to an adult that shows signs of having difficulty with a task, even if 
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the person helped is a stranger (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). In sum, these findings suggest that 
young children have prosocial tendencies that encourage their social actions and interactions. 
The development of the moral sense has become an area of great interest and debate for 
cognitive science. Moral sense is the capacity to make certain types of judgments. An important 
theory by Rawls (1971, as described by Hauser, 2006) expanded the understanding of the origin and 
development of a moral judgment. This theory is based on the analogy between the moral sense and 
the power of language described by Chomsky. In this proposal, it is assumed that there is a 
"universal moral grammar" with an innate knowledge that provides the foundations for the 
development of the moral judgment. The human mind would be equipped with universal principles 
that guide the development of moral skills. This biological endowment does not determine 
endogenously a moral system; otherwise, all cultures should develop the same value system. The 
cultural context specifies the content of principles in a way setting parameters. For this reason, the 
mechanism of principles and parameters explains the biological and cultural component of the 
moral system. There are two possible explanations for the development of the "moral sense" by two 
explanatory models by Hume and Rawls (Hauser, 2006). The "Hume" model, based on the 
proposition of innateness in the moral sense, without postulating a domain-specific expertise, 
recognizes the moral capacity to an emotional mechanism that encodes a positive and negative 
response to social situations leading to a moral judgment output. It is an automatic system studied 
by social psychology (Haidt, 2001). Finally, there are three possible types of “Rawlsian” model, 
weak, moderate and strong. The weak type for learning norms is equipped with a mechanism that is 
not born of any general principle; the moderate type comes with the principles and parameters to 
build a moral system; the strong type is born with specific moral principles, regardless of culture. 
Dupoux and Jacob (2007) argued that many cognitive processes, as the perception of color, do not 
have any grammatical structure and depend on our biological baggage. While not agreeing on the 
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parallelism between the moral faculty and the moral language, their position has not ruled out the 
source of the innate moral sense, assuming that moral judgment emerges from automatic emotional 
responses and that the complex computations take into account the intentions in social interactions. 
1.2 Prosocial behavior 
 In respect to infants showing a moral sense, experimental works have provided evidence that 
infants are sensitive to the valences of different actions. Premack and Premack (1997) presented 1-
year-olds with a computer animated display of spontaneous moving balls, in two positive 
interactions one ball acted positively towards another ball by caressing it or by helping it get 
through a narrow gateway, whereas in two negative interactions, one ball acted negatively by hitting 
another ball or preventing it from achieving its goal. Infants when habituated to positive interactions 
looked significantly longer when they were shown displays in which a character acted negatively 
towards another by hitting them and vice versa. These results suggest that infants found a helping 
action to be similar to a caressing action and a hindering action to be similar to an act of hitting. 
This study revealed that infants can recognized the commonality of valence shared by the two 
perceptually distinct prosocial interaction, in this case helping and caressing, and by two 
perceptually distinct antisocial interactions, in this case, hindering and hitting.  
Another study conducted by Hamlin, Wynn and Bloom (2007), found that infants are 
sensitive to the valence of social interactions when guessing the behavior of others. In this study, 
infants were shown events in which a character (the climber) attempted to climb a hill. They 
considered two conditions; in one condition, a character (the helper) pushed the climber from 
behind to help him climb uphill. In the other condition, a different character (hinderer) pushed the 
climber downhill. In the test events, the climber was shown, on alternate trials, to approach the 
helper or the hinderer, and infants looking times to these two events were measured. Results 
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provided evidence that infants can distinguish these events in their looking times, suggesting that 
they predicted the climber to hold distinct attitudes toward the two characters. Moreover, theses 
authors presented a second experiment by placing faces to these characters, making them noticeable 
social beings, 10-month-olds looked longer towards the scene that violates their expectation, in this 
case, they looked more when the climber approached the hinderer than when it approached the 
helper, suggesting that they expected the climber to be motivated to avoid the hinderer but not the 
helper. An explanation for these findings is that infants demonstrate an understanding of social 
evaluation, which is also in line with mental attributions to the characters.  
The development of prosocial behavior has been studied as early as the first months of life, 
bringing extensive research on infants, that claim this period is subject to rapid changes 
biologically, cognitively and affectively (Brownell & Carriger, 1990; Hay, Castle, Demetriou & 
Stimson, 1999). From the first months of life, there are clear signs of attention towards others and 
the manifestation of primitive forms of pro-sociality that pushes the child to communicate with 
others, to approach and take an interest in the activities and emotions of the people around him 
(Hay, 1994). Between 12 and 18 months, infants react to others' emotions clearly with positive 
contact and verbal reassurance to mothers and others (Zahn-Waxler, et al., 1992). Another prosocial 
behavior in early childhood is the sharing of objects as an attitude of comfort against another's 
"distress", a behavior that tends to emerge as early as 8 months (Hay & Rheingold, 1983). Several 
studies show that infants are capable of distinguishing the intent of an action from its physical 
consequences. Infants can already identify the intended goal of an action when outcome is unseen 
or that fails to achieve the goal (e.i. in 8-month-olds: Hamlin, Newman, & Wynn, 2009; in 12- to 
18-month-olds: Bellagamba &Tomasello, 1999; Csibra, Biro, Koos, & Gergely, 2003; Meltzoff, 
1995, as described in Killen & Smetana, 2015). In sum, these studies assess infants’ capacity to 
generate social expectations; they do not probe for the possible presence of early moral evaluation. 
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Therefore, the question is how infants feel about positive and negative social actions toward the 
actors that are involved.  
1.3 Early moral evaluation 
 A series of recent studies address this issue. Kuhlmeier, Wynn and Bloom (2003), presented 
12-month-olds with two computer-animated movies that showed a red ball that had to climb a hill. 
In one of the movies (the help movie), the ball climbed only halfway to the top of the hill and 
dropped down, after a second attempt a green triangle, that was observing the scene from the top of 
the screen, went down to help the red ball climb all the way up. In the second movie (the hinder 
movie), when the red ball tried the second climb attempt again, a yellow square, also an observer of 
the scene since the beginning, landed in front of the ball and pushed it down the hill. Would they 
feel warmly toward the helpful individual, and be negatively inclined toward hindering one? 
Subsequently, infants were shown, in a different scene without the hill, all three characters, the ball 
in the bottom and the square and triangle in the top; this was portrayed to measure infants’ looking-
time preference. Results revealed that 12-month-olds preferred the helpful individual, by 
demonstrating that they can evaluate an agent’s behavior based on previous actions in a different 
context. These findings were extended to two additional social conditions (Hamlin & Wynn, 2011). 
In the first condition, 5- and 9 month olds saw a stuffed animal puppet attempting to open the lid of 
a box, after many attempts, a ‘prosocial’ puppet (the opener) holds the lid open and helps open the 
box, another ‘antisocial’ puppet (the closer) jumps onto the lid of the box, shutting it. In second 
condition, infants saw a stuffed puppet (the protagonist) playing with a ball and jumping up and 
down. This puppet accidentally loses its ball to the end of the stage, the ball either rolls towards a 
prosocial puppet (the giver), which rolls the ball back to the protagonist, or towards an antisocial 
puppet (the taker), who picked it up and runs offstage with it. In both conditions, infants when 
encouraged to reach for a prosocial puppet or antisocial puppet, they chose the prosocial character.  
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 In the following paragraphs, I will describe studies that had a similar methodology, only this 
time observing a different type of social behavior, fair versus unfair allocation of resources, these 
studies measure looking times considering infants’ expectations and preference about fairness.  
Geraci and Surian (2011) showed 10- and 16-month-olds animated videos of an interaction 
between animals: a chicken served as an observer in the distribution of resources (two colored 
disks), a lion and a bear acted as distributors, a donkey and a cow were used as recipients. Each 
child watched two fair and two unfair distributions performed by the two distributors. The results 
showed that children tended to look longer at the scene when the chicken chose to approach the fair 
distributor, therefore showing their preference towards fair outcomes. At the final testing event (a 
manual choice task), two silhouettes of the lion and the bear were shown to the infant, and were 
asked “which one do you want? Pick it up”. The 10-month-olds guessed randomly, but the 16-
month-olds preferred the fair distributor over the unfair one. In studies using the violation of 
expectation paradigm (VOE), Schmidt & Sommerville (2011) presented infants with a video in 
which an adult actor (the distributor) sat at a table with two recipients, each having had a plate or 
glass in front of them. The distributor had a bowl of crackers (in one movie) or a pitcher of milk (in 
a second movie). After a black occluding screen appeared, which covered the actors’ plates and the 
contents of the bowl or pitcher. The distributor allocated the crackers or milk to each recipient; the 
black occluding screen concealed the exact amount distributed. On test trials, when the black screen 
was removed, infants saw: on equal outcomes, each actor had equal amounts of crackers (or milk); 
on unequal outcomes, one actor had more crackers (or milk) than the other. Infants showed a 
significant preference for the unequal outcome over the equal outcome, providing evidence that 15-
month-old infants expected resources to be distributed equally to the recipients (see Sloane, 
Baillargeon, Premack, 2012, for similar results with 19-month-old infants).  
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In a similar study, 15-month-olds (Sommerville, Schmidt, Yun & Burns, 2013), were 
presented with scenes in which a distributor allocated four resources between two recipients. The 
distributor divided two items between each recipient when making an equal distribution, and gave 
three items to a recipient and one item to the other when making an unequal distribution. This study 
showed further evidence that infants were attentive to the outcomes of the task showing sensitivity 
towards an equal distribution. In studies with 10-month-olds, Meristo & Surian (2013) provided 
evidence that at this age have the capacity to evaluate agents based on their distributive actions. 
Infants looked longer: when a reward was given to the unfair distributor showing a violation of 
infants’ expectations towards a fair distribution, and when antisocial actions were destined towards 
the unfair distributor rather than a fair distributor revealing that infants have an emerging sensitivity 
to fairness (Meristo & Surian, 2014). 
Finally, in a study with 21-month-olds, Dunfield and Kuhlmeier (2010) found that infants in 
their second year distinguished an ‘unwilling’ actor from an ‘unable’ actor, choosing to help the 
unable one. Infants were also equally willing to help an experimenter who managed (after trying) to 
hand them a toy, and an experimenter who tried but failed to do so. In this study, infants prioritized 
intent over outcome claiming that infants can understand the intention behind an action and that 
they can evaluate a behavior towards an agent based on their intent.  
After a broad overview of different studies, as described above, we could assume that 
infants’ social judgments are very similar to those of adults. The early emergence of social 
evaluations and sentiments, suggests that this ability is not entirely coming from experience in a 
particular social or cultural environment or also to exposure to specific linguistic practices, thus it 
suggests that there is an innate base to our moral development. Of course, there is still a long way to 
go, what we have seen until now does not cover moral reasoning as a whole. However, what is 
important is that what we do find in infants helps us understand the origins of morality.  
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1.5  Overview of studies 
 
Study 1 
We were interested in verifying the development of the emerging sense of fairness by 
anticipatory looks and manual preference. In the experiment, infants’ looking behavior was 
recorded during the observation of movies with equal and unequal resource allocation tasks. 
Sixteen 9-month-olds and sixteen 19-month-olds were presented with six distributions of 
resources, three performed by a fair and three by an unfair distributor towards two identical 
recipients. Finally, they were asked to express their preference for the fair or the unfair 
distributor by manually choosing one of them. Infants did not show any bias in their 
anticipatory looks, but, the older age group preferred the fair distributor in the manual choice 
task. 
 
Study 2  
Applying the same hypotheses as the previous study (divided as study 1 and 2), we investigated 
whether 11- and 15-month-olds display an emerging capacity to generate expectations about 
resource distributions, only this time using movies with real life settings and continuous resources. 
Infants were presented with 4 trials where milk was distributed, two trials performed by a fair 
actress and two trials by an unfair actress towards two identical bears. We used 2 types of looking 
behavior measures (anticipatory looks and looking times) and 2 types of preference tasks (visual 
preference and manual choice). Finally, 15-month-olds revealed to be able to evaluate agents and 
have an expectation towards an equitable resource distribution.  
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Study 3 
In this study, we focused on the early development of prosocial behavior, more specifically in 
helping behaviors. We tested 20- and 30-month-olds to see if after observing an equal and unequal 
resource allocation task there were differences in helping behaviors. In line with previous findings 
(Dunfield, Kuhlmeier, O’Connell, Kelley, 2011; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006), we prove once 
more that the human ability to engage in helping behaviors begins early in development; however, 
there is no evidence of a tendency by associating equal and unequal distributive actions with 
helping behaviors. 
 
Study 4 
In this study, we report 20- and 30-months-olds’ knowledge of the word 'good' in the two core 
domains of moral reasoning: fairness and harm. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of 
evidence that infants’ emerging moral competence is also mapped early onto an appropriate lexical 
item in the second year of life. We studied infants’ manual choice responses towards agents that 
perform fair/helping actions or unfair/hindering actions. Our results provide evidence that even if 
there is an already established emerging sense of fairness and harm in 20-month-old infants, these 
concepts are not yet correctly mapped at a linguistic level until 30 months for the harm domain, and 
later for the fairness domain. 
 
Study 5 
In this final study, we examined whether children of two different societies, Italian and Colombian 
children, are able to consider merit, studying 3, 4 and 5-6 year old children. We have taken into 
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account a similar procedure by Baumard, Mascaro and Chevallier (2012), revealing that children 
sometimes favor equality when given the chance, and that they have an underlying ability to 
understand that a greater contributor has the right to more than a lesser contributor. We presented 
children an acted out scenario with bears. Children were presented with two characters, a 
hardworking and a lazy working bear that were asked by an experimenter to play a game of 
building up a house. One worked more by finishing the house and the other less by giving up and 
not finishing. We evaluated children’s biscuit distributions. We did not find that children as young 
as three, or up to six, of two very different societies are able to consider merit or also have an 
egalitarian choice when given the chance. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Do infants evaluate agents’ fairness? An eye-tracker study 
Luca Surian, Isabel C. Neira-Gutiérrez, Federica Savazzi, Laura Franchin 
(In preparation) 
 
Abstract 
 
Recent studies on looking times suggest that infants display an emerging capacity to generate 
expectations about resource distributions. We investigated the development of the emerging 
sense of fairness using both anticipatory looks and manual preference. Infants were tested by 
recording their looking behavior during the observation of short movies showing equal and 
unequal resource allocations. Participants were 16 9-month-olds and 16 19-month-olds. After a 
familiarization phase, infants were presented with six distributions of resources, three 
performed by a fair and three by an unfair distributor towards two identical recipients. Finally, 
infants were asked to express their preference for the fair or the unfair distributor by manually 
choosing one of them. Anticipatory looks did not reveal any expectation of fairness, but the 19-
month-olds preferred the fair distributor in the manual choice task.  
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2.1 Introduction 
Is the ability to generate moral judgments (evaluations of the actions or character of a 
person that are made as a result to a set of virtues held to be obligatory by a culture, see Haidt, 
2001) present in early childhood? Is it acquired by means of innate domain specific 
mechanisms? Classical cognitive-developmental theories on moral development suggested that 
this is not the case (Piaget, 1932; Kohlberg, 1971). As Piaget (1932) noted, the existence of 
ways of thinking or acting by age 3 cannot be taken to mean that they have an innate or 
instinctual source, considering the fact that by this age children have already been exposed to 
experience brought upon by multiple social interactions, including influences from their 
interactions with adults. Therefore, Piaget describes from experience using verbal methods that 
a child’s sensitivity to moral judgments develop very gradually and follow a phase-like 
progression from three kinds of rules: irrelevant rules (giving according to their own 
preference), simple egalitarian rules (everyone gets the same, equality) and complex merit-
based rules (giving based on how someone contributed to a task, equity) (Piaget, 1932).  
These rules have been studied in several investigations that have operated verbal 
methods and have provided evidence that sensitivity to moral rules do not emerge until the 
preschool years or later (Fehr, Bernhard & Rockenbach, 2008; Damon, 1975; Fehr, Glätzle-
Rützler & Sutter, 2013; Lane & Coon, 1972; Moore, 2009; Olsen & Spelke, 2008; Rochat, 
Dias, Liping, Broesch, Passos-Ferreira, Winning & Berg, 2009; Shaw & Olsen, 2013; Shaw, 
Montinari, Piovesan, Olson, Gino & Norton, 2014; Ugurel-Semin, 1952). However, in the last 
decades, alternative research has proposed a quite different view: moral development takes off 
starting from very early-emerging sociomoral intuitions (Dupoux & Jacob, 2007; Green, 2005; 
Premack, 2007). To provide evidence to the empirical question of whether sociomoral 
expectations are already present in infancy, we aim to deepen the study of the development of 
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children's social cognition focusing on the "sense of fairness" or equality using resource 
allocation tasks. 
Current research on looking times suggest that infants display an emerging capacity to 
generate fair expectations in resource allocation tasks by taking into account agents’ 
distributive actions. In particular, Schmidt and Sommerville (2011) provided evidence that 15-
month-olds expected resources to be distributed equally when observing others (a third party). 
This study presented a sequence of movies showing the infant an actor allocating continuous 
(milk) and discrete (crackers) resources to two recipients; the outcome of the resource 
distribution was occluded by a black screen, at the final test phase of each movie a still frame 
depicted an equal and an unequal outcome. Infants looked significantly longer to the unequal 
versus the equal outcome, suggesting that these events violated infants’ expectation (VOE) of 
third-party fairness. This result reveals the presence of rudimentary expectations as early as 15 
months on equitable distribution of resources between interacting individuals. In another study 
with movies, Geraci and Surian (2011), showed 16-month-olds two distributive puppets (a lion 
and a bear), two receiver puppets (a donkey and a cow) and an observer (a chicken). One of the 
distributive puppets gave each receiver one multicolor disk, the other gave one receiver two 
disks and the other receiver nothing. Infants expected other agents to affiliate with or approach 
fair over unfair distributors and with a manual choice test, the authors demonstrated a 
significant tendency to pick up the fair rather than the unfair distributor. Similarly, Sloane, 
Baillargeon and Premack (2012) showed that 19-month-olds expected a distributor to divide 
resources equally using live events where an experimenter divided two resources between two 
animated puppets (giraffes) , also when having inanimate objects and when showing the 
resources from the recipients (removing covers from in front, revealing the resources) instead 
of distributing them.  
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Sommerville, Schmidt, Yun and Burns (2013) presented 15-month-olds with movies in 
which a distributor allocated four resources between two recipients. The distributor divided two 
items between each recipient when making an equal distribution, and gave three items to a 
recipient and one item to the other when making an unequal distribution. These authors found 
again that infants were attentive to the outcomes of the task showing a sensitivity towards an 
equal distribution. And, Meristo and Surian (2013) found yet in 10-month-olds a preference 
towards the fair distributor. In this study, infants first watched equal and unequal distributions 
carried out by a fair and an unfair distributor including also an observer who witnessed their 
actions. The observer later gave one resource to either the fair or the unfair distributor 
respectively showing a preference for the equal or the unequal event. Infants looked longer 
when a reward was given to the unfair distributor showing a violation of infants’ expectation 
towards a fair distribution. Subsequently, Meristo and Surian (2014) carried out a similar study, 
only this time a third agent hits or takes resources away from either the fair or the unfair 
distributor. Results reveal that infants look longer when antisocial actions were destined 
towards the unfair distributor supporting, yet again, the fact that infants are able to evaluate 
agents based on their distributive actions. What all studies until this point have in common is 
that they find positive results on infants’ tendency of expecting an equal distribution by 
considering how much they looked at outcomes in resource allocation tasks.  
Another way of measuring a child’s expectation is by using an anticipatory looking 
paradigm. Particularly, false belief studies have shown that by anticipatory looking behavior 
there is a correct prediction of an actor’s actions, in 25-month-olds (Southgate, Senju & Csibra, 
2007) and also down to 18-month-olds (Senju, Southgate, Snape, Leonard & Csibra, 2011). In 
the anticipatory looking paradigm, the child’s specific expectation of where the actor will 
search is measured, and it could help to address the question of where the child specifically 
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would expect a distributor or agent to allocate their available resources in a resource allocation 
task. However, in these types of tasks in order to understand if the child has a sensitivity to 
fairness, the attempts to date have not been encouraging since there has not been any salient 
effects in anticipatory looking behaviors (Geraci & Surian, 2011).  
Taking into account all recent literature, the present experiment was aimed at studying 
the early social evaluations to assess the understanding of the emerging sense of fairness in 
infants, by taking into account the outcome of distributive actions and reasoning about a 
distributor’s actions. We modeled our procedure around Geraci and Surian’s (2011) study. The 
task was simplified by introducing directly two recipients and immediately after showing the 
test events. We presented a total of six test events, 3 involving an agent that distributed two 
strawberries equally to each recipient and 3 involving another agent that distributed two 
strawberries to only one of the two recipients. We wished to see, if by simplifying the task, we 
could enable a response through visual anticipation when an agent is performing distributive 
actions. And also, how this type of paradigm (anticipatory looks) can be another valid 
instrument that can be used to assess the “sense of  fairness” in infants. Later, based on these 
distributive action outcomes we observed if infants are able to identify the distributor/agent by 
a manual choice task. Therefore, we hypothesized that infants reveal: (1) a fair expectation in 
the resource allocation task, and (2) a preference for the egalitarian distributor/donor in the 
manual choice task. 
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2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Participants 
Thirty-two infants participated: 16 9-month-olds (6 females; mean age = 9 months and 
15 days, SD =1 month and 9 days, range = 7 - 12 months) and 16 19 month-old infants (5 
females; mean age = 19 months and 15 days, SD = 2 months and 9 days, range = 16 – 22 
months) made the older group. An additional 8 9-month-old infants were excluded for 
fuzziness (N = 2), inability to get a calibration (N = 3), or by looking at less than 3 out of 6 of 
the target areas (N= 3), and an additional 4 19-month-old infants were excluded for fuzziness 
(N = 1), inability to get a calibration (N = 1), or by looking at less than 3 out of 6 of the target 
areas (N= 2).  
2.2.2 Procedure and Stimuli 
The province of Trento’s coordinator for daycares was in charge of contacting and 
sending all daycares an information sheet and consent form with all the information regarding 
the study to give out to all the parents. Some participating families were contacted by normal 
mail, this contact information taken from the database of the town hall among families who 
were living in the Rovereto area (Italy). Infants were tested at five different daycares or the 
Department of Psychology and Cognitive Science, University of Trento. The experimental 
procedure was approved by the local ethics committee (University of Trento).  
During test sessions, infants were tested individually in a quiet room. They were seated 
on an educator or parent’s lap with a distance of 50-70 cm from the eye-tracker. They were 
presented with cartoon animations created with Adobe Flash Professional and showed on a 17” 
inch monitor running the Tobii Studio 3.0.0 software. During the screening of the films, the 
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gazing behavior of infants was detected and recorded with the Tobii eye-tracker T120 device. 
Infants were also videotaped using two video cameras (Panasonic SDR-H20, Sony handycam 
DCR-HC27E), one in front and one behind the child; these recordings have been used to verify 
the data collected with the eye-tracker concerning the direction of the eye-gaze, and some other 
observational aspects needed for the test events.  
Following a 2-point calibration phase, infants were presented with two test events, each 
consisted of a familiarization phase and a distribution phase. In the familiarization phase, there 
were two  identical green triangles, with schematic mouths and eyes, presented on the upper 
side of a screen on a grey background, one on the left side and one on the right side (11 cm’s 
apart from each other). Both triangles moved in lateral directions twice (1 cm) at the same time 
(4 seconds elapsed) (see Fig.1a). Familiarization phase is important because it provides infants 
with dynamic cues about the agentive nature of the receivers. 
In the distribution phase, infants were presented with six distributions of resources (i.e., 
two strawberries) performed by two distributors (either a yellow circle or a blue square, both 
with eyes and mouth). The distributor gives strawberries to two triangles (the two green 
triangles presented in the familiarization event), henceforth the ‘recipients’. At the beginning of 
each trial, the distributor appears from below the screen with two strawberries (see Fig.1b) and 
it allocates a strawberry to a recipient and then returns to its initial position (see Fig.1c). When 
the first triangle receives the strawberry, it jumps once. Afterwards, a brown occlusive screen is 
lowered from above hiding almost all the upper half of the grey background including the 
bottom part of the recipients (only the upper part of the two triangles remained visible) (see 
Fig.1d). Therefore, infants were prevented from seeing the outcome of the second strawberry’s 
assignment when the distributor allocates it. The moment the triangle receives the second 
strawberry, it jumps once, revealing its position. Three seconds elapse from the moment the 
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distributor disappears behind the screen to the moment before the recipient jumps. This was the 
time infants’ anticipatory looks were recorded (see Fig.1e). The distributor could, depending on 
the scene, assign the second strawberry to the triangle that had already received one previously 
(unfair distribution) or to the triangle that had not yet received one (equal/fair distribution). At 
the end of the scene, when the distributor returns to the initial position, the occlusive screen 
was raised and an equal or unequal distribution outcome was revealed (see Fig.1f). Each test 
event stimuli lasted 23 seconds. 
Each infant saw three equal (E) and three unequal (U) allocation of resources presented 
in two test orders (Order 1: EUUEEU; Order 2: UEEUUE). Equal distributions were all 
performed by the same agent, the ‘fair distributor’, while unequal distributions were all 
performed by the other agent, the ‘unfair distributor’. The following variables were 
counterbalanced across participants: test order, identity of the fair and unfair agent, and side of 
the triangle that received the first strawberry. 
Infants’ behavior was analyzed by two types of responses:  
Anticipatory measures. Two anticipatory measures were recorded during the 
distribution phase in all six trials. 1) First anticipatory looks, and 2) Anticipatory looking times. 
Both measures taken from the moment the distributor disappeared with the second strawberry 
behind the occlusive screen to the moment before the recipient jumped. Four Areas of Interest 
(AoI’s) were created, two (broad and narrow) including the side of the triangle that had already 
received the strawberry (Unfair allocation) and two including the side of the triangle that had 
not yet received the strawberry (Fair allocation) (see Fig. 2). 
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Figure 1. Video sequence of test events: familiarization phase and distribution phase with the two possible 
outcomes: an equal or unequal distribution. All scenes have two green triangle recipients which initially are given 
a strawberry (only one of them, Left/Right) later to be occluded by a brown rectangular screen when an agent (fair 
or unfair) is distributing the second strawberry. 
 
Fair outcome Unfair outcome 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e.
f. 
Familiarization 
Phase 
Distribution 
Phase 
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Figure 2. AoI’s created for the analysis of anticipatory looks. The two areas (broad and narrow) written as Not 
Received is where the agent has not yet received a strawberry, and the Received are the areas (broad and narrow) 
where it has already received one. 
 
Manual choice task. Immediately after having seen the last test event, infants were 
presented with a manual choice task. A 32 cm x 21 cm white tray with two 6 cm x 6 cm cut-out 
41tyrofoam shapes representing the distributors (i.e., the yellow circle and the blue square) was 
placed in front of the infant (see Hamlin, Wynn and Bloom, 2007 for procedural details). If 
infants did not spontaneously reach for one of the two shapes, after 5 seconds they were 
encouraged to pick up one by asking them: ‘Which one do you want? Pick it up’. About half of 
the participants saw the fair agent on the left and the unfair agent on the right, and the others 
saw the reverse disposition of the distributors. Infants’ preferences for the fair or unfair agent 
were analyzed by coding their answers at the manual choice task. Two experimenters coded 
independently infants’ responses, one was blind to the fairness of the donor. The inter-judges 
agreement was 100%.  
 
(narrow) (narrow) 
(broad) (broad) 
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2.3 Results 
Preliminary analysis showed that there was not a significant influence of the test order, 
the identity of the fair and unfair donors and the side of the triangle that received the first 
strawberry on the first anticipatory looks and on the anticipatory looking times. 
Anticipatory looks. This measure is divided by two levels, first anticipatory looks and 
anticipatory looking times. 
1. First anticipatory looks measures the side of the first anticipatory looks infants made 
on the two AoI’s, reported on Table 1. Infants of both age-groups did not show any bias for one 
of the two broad AoI’s (two-choice binomial test, two tailed, all ps > .21), although, for the 
third trial 9-month-olds looked more times towards an unfair allocation on the narrow AoI’s 
(two-choice binomial test, two tailed,  p= .001), this information is not relevant because there is 
no pattern of this ‘unfairness’ in the rest of the trials (two-choice binomial test, two tailed, all 
ps > .08). the older group showed no significant bias in any of the sides of the narrow AoI’s in 
all trials (two-choice binomial test, two tailed, all ps > .21).  
Table 1  
First anticipatory looks in both broad and narrow AoI’s. 
Note. b = broad AoI’s; n = narrow AoI’s; 0 = no anticipation. Frequency of where the infant looked first in the 
AoI’s. Unfair allocation = AoI where the triangle had already received a strawberry; Fair allocation = AoI where 
the triangle has not yet received a strawberry. 
9 months  19 months  
 
Trial 
 
Unfair Allocation 
 
Fair Allocation 
 
Unfair Allocation Fair Allocation  
 b n b n 0 b n b n 0 
1 9 4 7 12 0 9 5 7 10 1 
2 8 5 7 4 8 8 5 7 8 4 
3 10 14 6 0 9 7 11 6 5 8 
4 6 6 6 1 13 9 5 6 8 4 
5 7 7 4 2 12 11 6 5 10 0 
6 4 3 9 4 12 7 4 6 7 8 
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In order to see if there is a possible learning effect in the first anticipatory looks, we 
took into account the AoI’s (broad and narrow) of the first anticipatory looks in both age 
groups of all six trials, and observed if infants were consistent to the areas where there was a  
fair allocation (infant expects the fair agent to give a fair distribution) or an unfair allocation 
(infant expects the unfair agent to give an unfair distribution). And also, if the AoI’s where 
infants first looked were not consistent to the areas where there was a fair allocation (infant 
expected the fair agent to give an unfair distribution) or an unfair allocation (infant expected 
the unfair agent to give an fair distribution).  
As reported on table 2, there was no pattern aligning a possible learning effect in both 
broad and narrow AoI’s in both age groups. In the broad AoI’s for the first and second trial 
infants in both age groups showed that both consistent and not consistent views were at chance 
(first trial: 56% consistent, 44% not consistent, and second trial 50% consistent and 44% not 
consistent) proving that they had no previous knowledge of the agents’ behaviors. In the 
following trials, there was a decrease in consistent and not consistent views from 9-month-olds, 
a part from the third trial that went up to 10 (63%) in the not consistent views in the broad 
AoI’s. In the broad AoI’s, 19-month-olds showed an increase in consistent views in the fifth 
trial (11, 69%), but in the sixth the views decreased to 7 (44%). Lastly, there was a decrease in 
not consistent views from the third trial on (5, 50%; 6, 38%; 5, 31%; 6, 38%). In the narrow 
AoI’s there were less views than the broad AoI’s, nonetheless, it showed a similar pattern.  
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Table 2  
Consistent and not consistent views in both broad and narrow AoI’s. 
9 months  19 months 
 
Trial 
 
Consistent views 
 
Not consistent views 
 
Consistent views   Not consistent views 
 b n b n b n b      n 
1 9 (56%) 10 (63%) 7 (44%) 6 (38%)  9 (56%) 9 (56%) 7 (44%) 6 (38%)  
2 8 (50%) 5 (31%) 7 (44%) 4 (25%)  8 (50%) 6 (38%) 7 (44%) 7 (44%) 
3 6 (38%) 7 (44%) 10 (63%) 7 (44%)  5 (31%) 5 (31%) 8 (50%) 9 (56%) 
4 7 (44%) 5 (31%) 5 (31%) 2 (13%)  9 (56%) 5 (31%) 6 (38%) 8 (50%) 
5 7 (44%) 6 (38%) 4 (25%) 3 (19%) 11 (69%) 10 (63%) 5 (31%) 6 (38%) 
6 6 (38%) 4 (25%) 7 (44%) 3 (19%)  7 (44%) 6 (38%) 6 (38%) 5 (31%)  
Note: b = broad AoI’s; n = narrow AoI’s. Frequency (with percentage) of consistency and inconsistency in the 
AoI’s (broad and narrow) of all six trials in both age groups. Consistent views = Infant looked at the AoI where 
fair agent allocated the second strawberry to the recipient with no strawberry or the AoI where Unfair agent 
allocated the second strawberry to recipient with a strawberry. Non consistent views= Infant looked at the AoI 
where fair agent allocated the second strawberry to the recipient with a strawberry or the AoI where Unfair agent 
allocated the second strawberry to recipient with no strawberry. 
 
2. Looking times measures the overall duration of fixations in the two AoI’s. There was 
no significant differences in the average anticipatory looking times on the two broad AoI’s (all 
ps >. 32) and the two narrow AoI’s (all ps >.09) in all six trials for both age groups (see Tab. 3) 
Table 3 
Mean looking times (and SD) during anticipatory looks in both broad and narrow AoI’s. 
9 months  19 months 
 
Trial 
 
Unfair Allocation 
 
Fair Allocation 
 
Unfair Allocation   Fair Allocation 
 b n b n b n b      n 
1 .62 (.56) .43 (.55) .90 (.71) .55 (.60) .90 (.71) .63 (.17) .91 (.69) .66 (.51)  
2 .54 (.56) .35 (.47) .48 (.60) .24 (.41) .70 (.75) .45 (.63) .88 (.74) .77 (.65) 
3 .78 (.55) .67 (.58) .45 (.35) .24 (.35) .71 (.75) .54 (.76) .70 (.57) .53 (.50) 
4 .42 (.51) .32 (.49) .26 (.40) .17 (34) .65 (.65) .50 (.61) .87 (.63) .66 (.57) 
5 .53 (.63) .40 (.55) .27 (.41) .15 (.30) .31 (.38) .20 (.29) .85 (.59) .66 (.56) 
6 .36 (.74) .27 (.62) .27 (.45) .17 (.31) .52 (.61) .29 (.40) .45 (.52) .29 (.10)  
Note: b = broad AoI’s; n = narrow AoI’s. t-tests were used to measure means. 
We tested the influence of age on looking times with a 2 (group: younger vs. older) x 2 
(AoI’s: unfair allocation vs. fair allocation) x 6 (trials) ANOVA. A main effect of group (F(1, 
30)= 9.025, p = .005, η2 = .23, δ = .83) and of trials (F(5, 26) = 4.903, p = .003, η2 = .48, δ = 
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.95) were found on the broad AoI’s. Older infants looked on average longer at the six trails (M 
= .70, SD = .051) than younger infants (M = .50, SD = .052). The first trial received longer 
fixations (M = .83, SD = .05) than the fourth (M = .55, SD = .07, p = .026), the fifth (M = .49, 
SD = .06, p = .001) and the sixth (M = .40, SD = .06, p < .001) trials. However, only a main 
effect of group was found on the narrow AoI’s (F(1, 30)= 6,087, p = .020, η2 = .17, δ = .67). 
Finally, in order to look for a possible learning effect on the two types of distributors   
(fair distributor or unfair distributor) seen in the previous trials, we analyzed the anticipatory 
looking times in all 6 trials. A 2 (AoI: same receiver vs. different receiver) x 2 (type of donor: 
fair donor vs. unfair donor) x 6 (trials) ANOVA was performed with AoI and trial as within 
subjects factors. No significant main effects or significant interactions were found for both 
groups in the broad AoI’s. More specifically, there was no significant interactions between the 
type of donor and the AoI: the average time the younger group looked at the triangle who had 
not yet received the strawberry when the donor was fair or unfair did not differ from the 
average time they looked at the triangle who had already received the strawberry when the 
donor was fair or F(1, 14) = .003, p = .96, η2 = .00, δ = .050. The average time the older group 
looked at the triangle who had not yet received the strawberry when the donor was fair or 
unfair did not differ significantly from the average time they looked at the triangle who had 
already received the strawberry when the donor was fair or unfair F(1, 14) = 1.015, p = .33, η2 
= .07, δ = .16. For the narrow AoI’s, again there was No association between the type of donor 
(fair agent vs. unfair agent) and the AoI in which infants made their first anticipatory look (fair 
allocation vs. unfair allocation) in all trials: younger group F(1, 14) = .041, p = .84, η2 = .003, δ 
= .054, older group F(1, 14) = .001, p = .97, η2 = .00, δ = .050. 
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Manual choice task. Two infants in the younger group and 4 in the older group did not 
choose any agent. Among those who answered to the task, in the younger group, 6 infants 
picked up the fair distributor (43%) and 8 chose the unfair distributor (57%) and the difference 
in the choices was not significant, two-choice binomial test, two-tailed, p = .79. In the older 
group, 10 infants picked up the fair distributor (83%) and 2 chose the unfair distributor (17%). 
In this group of age, the difference in the choices was significant, showing a preference for the 
19-month-olds to choose the fair distributor, two-choice binomial test, two-tailed, p = .04 (see 
Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4.  Frequency of infants who chose the fair or the unfair distributor in the manual choice task. 
 
2.4 Discussion 
In this study, we investigated whether 9- and 19-month-olds are sensitive to fairness in a 
resource allocation task. Overall, the results of the present study suggest that infants aged 19 
months, revealed an emerging sensitivity to fairness when choosing manually between a fair 
and an unfair distributor, after observing resource distributive actions. Additionally, this 
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‘preference’ for the fair agent in the manual choice task demonstrates that children were 
sensitive to the different outcomes given by the agents that distributed the strawberries. This 
finding confirms previous results that showed children at this age should already have this type 
of sensitivity (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011; Sloane et al., 2012). 
However, there was no important effect when analyzing if the child had an equal or unequal 
expectation once the strawberry was given to the second recipient, nor a particular visual 
exploration revealing infants’ inclination for any of the distributions, therefore, this also 
confirms that even by simplifying the scenes, a visual anticipation of the agents’ outcomes was 
still not detected by children of both age groups. This proves, once more, that measuring 
anticipatory looks in order to demonstrate an infant’s expectation is still not accessible at this 
age (Geraci & Surian, 2011, Southgate et al., 2007).   
Nevertheless, we can suggest that based on our results older participants reveal a better 
understanding of what was happening in the trials because of their positive responses favoring 
the fair distributor in the manual choice task. An explanation for these results may be due to the 
fact that they looked reliably longer at all six trials than the younger infants showing 
attentiveness towards the administered outcomes (Sommerville et al. 2013).  
Have we proven if the ability to generate moral judgments is present in early childhood? 
Moreover, if this is the case, is it acquired by means of innate domain specific mechanisms? 
Authors like Hamlin (2013), argue that already there is strong evidence supporting this claim, 
in fact, her previous works has contributed to the nativist approach describing how human 
infants demonstrate morally relevant motivations and evaluations that do not appear to be 
brought on from socialization or moral specific experiences (Hamlin et al., 2007; Hamlin & 
Wynn, 2011). Our study supports this conclusion by revealing that by 19 months, infants show 
sensitivity to moral reasoning since they have the capacity of understanding agents’ 
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dispositions based on their distributive action outcomes. We can also think that there might be 
some indirect sensibility to moral emotion towards the distributors (or agents), a type of 
empathic reaction associated to the pain produced in the victims of such unfair distributions 
(Hoffman, 1991). However, this assumption is withdrawn from previous conclusions that show 
that there is no relation between early negative evaluations and infant’s empathic reaction 
towards victims of such distributions with the understanding of agents’ goals (Gergely & 
Csibra, 2003; Geraci & Surian, 2011). Overall, despite infants’ rudimentary exposure to 
external stimulation or parental education, infants’ sole preference towards a fair distributor or 
agent is empirical proof that there is in fact an innate sensitivity to abstract principles of 
fairness or equality. 
Our study is in line with the data found to date regarding both age groups (Geraci & 
Surian, 2011; Sloane et al, 2012). These findings have begun to contribute to issues worth 
studying, like determining at what age infants first prefer fair allocations and discovering 
whether this initial preference involves a simple concept of equality, individuals should be 
treated equally, and not by what individuals deserve, e.g. rewarded by the amount of work done 
(Sloane et al., 2012). In addition, it is important that by considering the anticipatory looking 
paradigm instead of the violation of expectation paradigm we could be observing a more 
explicit result in resource allocation tasks, due to the fact that it is more specific where infants 
expect a distributor to allocate their available resources. In sum, even if our findings do not 
show specific anticipatory looking behavior from infants as young as 19 months in equal and 
unequal resource allocation tasks, it still opens a completely different approach of how we 
measure the understanding of a child’s expectation.  
Reviewing previous literature and assuming that in fact there is an innate sensitivity in 
each child when they are born, there may be a possibility that heritance can play a role when 
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talking about different levels of this kind of sensitivity, i.e. An infant from a sociopath or an 
infant from a minister. This may perhaps be explained by identifying a genetic code in future 
research (Joyce, 2006). Up to now, the type of empirical research we carried out in this study 
can only explain this statement. Nevertheless, assuming that early social stimulation could 
result in the same level of morality, if so; could this be a good alternative for a much better 
society if all children are intervened early in life?  
For future studies, it is important to point out that there can be further investigation 
regarding infant’s anticipatory looking behavior considering the fact that infants use a lot of 
anticipatory behavior in their daily life, like, knowing what comes after a determined action or 
acting towards an expected behavior (i.e. ring around a rosie). However, we have proven that 
infants as early as 19-months do not demonstrate to have an expectation when observing equal 
and unequal distributive actions. As for the procedure, it would be interesting to use a more 
realistic scenario to see if we are able to pull down the age group (Hamlin et al., 2007; 
Southgate et al., 2007). In conclusion, this study affirms the fact that our species is indeed 
based on innate predispositions when speaking about moral thought and action, and this is very 
important to understand the origins of social cognition.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Infants’ expectation of a fair distribution of continuous resources. An eye-
tracker study with 11- and 15-months old infants 
Isabel C. Neira-Gutiérrez, Federica Savazzi, Luca Surian 
(In preparation) 
 
Abstract 
 
We report findings concerning the development of the emerging sense of fairness in 11- and 15-
month-olds, a topic that has attracted a lot of attention and led to homogeneous results. We were 
interested in studying whether infants display an emerging capacity to generate expectations about 
resource distributions using movies with real life settings and continuous resources. In the 
experiment, infants were presented with 4 trials where milk was distributed, two trials performed by 
a fair actress and two trials by an unfair actress towards two identical bears. Infants were tested by 
recording their looking behavior during the observation of movies with equal and unequal resource 
allocation tasks using 2 types of looking behavior measures (anticipatory looks and looking times) 
and 2 types of preference tasks (visual preference and manual choice). 15-month-olds revealed to be 
able to evaluate agents and have an expectation towards an equitable resource distribution.   
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3.1 Introduction 
Do humans possess spontaneous evaluation skills that are applied to agents’ distributive 
actions? Less than a decade of research on looking times suggests that this is in fact the case. 
Studies on 15-month-olds reveal that  infants look significantly longer to the unequal versus the 
equal outcome, suggesting that these events violated infants’ expectation (VOE paradigm, see 
Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007), which claims the presence of rudimentary expectations for a fair 
distribution of resources (Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011; Sommerville, Schmidt, Yun & Burns, 
2013). In a study (Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011), infants were presented with a video in which an 
adult actor (the distributor) sat at a table with two recipients, each having had a plate or glass in 
front of them. The distributor had a bowl of crackers (in one movie) or a pitcher of milk (in a 
second movie). After a black occluding screen appeared, covering the actors’ plates and the 
contents of the bowl or pitcher. The distributor allocated the crackers or milk to each recipient; the 
black occluding screen concealed the exact amount distributed. On test trials, when the black screen 
was removed, infants saw: on equal outcomes, each actor had equal amounts of crackers (or milk); 
on unequal outcomes, one actor had more crackers (or milk) than the other. Infants showed a 
significant preference for the unequal outcome over the equal outcome, providing evidence that 15-
month-old infants expected resources to be distributed equally to the recipients (see Sloane, 
Baillargeon, Premack, 2012, for similar results with 19-month-old infants).  
In another study, 15-month-olds (Sommerville et al., 2013), with a similar procedure to 
Schmidt and Sommerville (2011) only this time without continuous resources, were presented with 
scenes in which a distributor allocated four resources between two recipients. The distributor 
divided two items between each recipient when making an equal distribution, and gave three items 
to a recipient and one item to the other when making an unequal distribution. This study showed 
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further evidence that infants were attentive to the outcomes of the task showing a sensitivity 
towards an equal distribution using VOE.  
In a study with 16-month-olds Geraci & Surian (2011), revealed that infants use information 
about how an agent distributes resources to guide their expectations of subsequent social 
interactions involving distributors and recipients, as well as their own preferences for different 
kinds of distributors with a manual choice task. Infants looked longer when the agent approached 
the fair distributor. In addition, when given a manual choice task, 16-month-olds selected the fair 
over the unfair distributor. In studies with 10-month-olds, Meristo & Surian (2013) provided 
evidence that at this age have the capacity to evaluate agents based on their distributive actions. 
Infants looked longer: when a reward was given to the unfair distributor showing a violation of 
infants’ expectations towards a fair distribution, and when antisocial actions were destined towards 
the unfair distributor rather than a fair distributor revealing that infants have an emerging sensitivity 
to fairness (Meristo & Surian, 2014). 
Placing together all previous studies, the results reveal that during the second year of life 
infants expect goods and resources to be allocated equally to recipients, prefer agents that perform 
fair (equal) distributions, and expect other agents to affiliate with or approach fair over unfair 
distributors. Infants’ expectations do not appear to be reducible to perceptual biases (e.g., 
preferences for ‘asymmetry’: in continuous and categorical quantities) and are flexible based on the 
social context.  
In order to prove this point, we created two studies where we were interested in analyzing 
whether an early sense of fairness emerges already at 11 and 15-months of age using a resource 
allocation task of continuous resources. We tested each age groups separately to observe if there is a 
notable developmental change. Infants were tested by recording their looking behavior during the 
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observation of movies with a realistic setting. Infants saw two distributive agents allocating milk to 
two teddy bears: one agent allocated resources in a fair way and the other one in an unfair way. The 
outcomes of fair or unfair distributions differed for the asymmetry in the amount of milk that the 
distributor gave to the recipients. The expectation about a fair distribution was analyzed adopting a 
research paradigm that has proven effective for studying the real expectation in pre-verbal children 
in the field of Theory of Mind (Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007) and also the VOE paradigm.  
Finally, we predicted that infants would: a) anticipate an equal distribution (as indexed by 
the side on which they made a fixation a moment before they knew the second distribution was to 
happen). b) notice when the outcome of the distribution was unequal following the violation of 
expectation paradigm (i.e., look longer at the unexpected unequal outcome of distributions). c) 
show a preference for the fair or unfair distributor (visual preference: looking longer to one of the 
two; manual preference: reaching for the picture of the fair or unfair distributor in a manual choice 
task).  
3.2 Study 1 
3.2.1 Method 
3.2.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-two 11-month olds (19 females; mean age = 351.34 days, SD = 22.35; range = 311-
383 days) took part in the study. An additional 12 infants were excluded for: fuzziness (n = 4), an 
inability to get a calibration (n = 5), crying (n = 2) which made impossible the recording of eye-
movements, and an experimental error (n = 1).  
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3.2.1.2 Materials and Procedure  
Five daycares were contacted in Rovereto (Italy). Also, some participating families were 
contacted by normal mail, this contact information was taken from the database of the town hall 
among families who were living in the area. An information sheet and consent form with all the 
information regarding the study was handed out to all the parents. The experimental procedure was 
approved by the ethics committee of the University of Trento. Infants were tested individually in a 
quiet room at five different daycares or the Department of Psychology and Cognitive Science, 
University of Trento. Children were seated on a caregiver’s (educator or parent) lap at a distance of 
approximately 60 cm from the monitor.  
Infants were videotaped using two video cameras (Panasonic SDR-H20, Sony handycam 
DCR-HC27E), one in front and one behind the infant; these recordings have been used to verify the 
data collected with the eye-tracker concerning the direction of the eye-gaze, and some other 
observational aspects needed for the final distribution phase. 
We used a Tobii eye-tracker T120 device to detect infants’ eye-movements during the 
presentation of movies on a 17” TFT monitor. Caregivers were asked to close their eyes during eye-
movement registration. The presentation of the video was run through the software Tobii Studio 
3.0.0. Before the presentation of the animation stimuli, a calibration session was always run (for 
details on this procedure see Gredebäck, Johnson & von Hofsten, 2010). 
Infants were presented with two test events, each consisted of a familiarization phase and a 
distribution phase.  In the familiarization phase, infants were presented with two trials. In these 
trials, a girl carrying a jug full of milk entered the scene (Fig. 1a) and went behind a panel with a 
green window leaving her head in full view. In front of the panel, there was an empty glass 
underneath the window and a teddy bear next to it. When the window illuminated a chime rang 
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simultaneously (Fig. 1b). After three seconds the light went off, and the actress opened the window 
and poured some milk into the glass (Fig. 1c). The two scenes differed only in the identity of the 
distributor: on one trial children saw a girl with a pink visor with three vertical straight white stripes 
and on the other trial they saw a different girl wearing an orange visor with a single white zigzag 
line. The order of presentation of the two familiarization trials was counterbalanced across subjects.  
Figure 1. Video sequence of the familiarization phase; (a) picture showing the actor entering the scene while a bear 
observes; (b) picture showing the actor behind the window while the bear is looking at the illuminated window which  
simoultaneusly a chime rings; (c) picture showing the actor pouring a full glass of milk from the window right after the 
window was turned off. 
 
The distribution phase consisted of four test trials, in each test trail, infants were presented 
with a distributive action in which a human agent or distributor (one of the two experimenters 
previously seen in the familiarization trials) poured some milk to two identical teddy bears (see Fig. 
2), henceforth the ‘recipients’. This time, the distributor carrying the milk went behind a panel with 
two green windows (Fig. 2a), one on the left and one on the right side of the panel. In front of the 
two windows there were two glasses and next to each glass a teddy bear. The moment the 
distributor arrived to the center of the panel both windows illuminated at the same time for three 
seconds, and a chime rang simultaneously (Fig. 2b). Immediately after, the distributor opened one 
a. b c. 
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of the two windows (with one hand) and poured some milk into the glass in front of it (Equal 
distribution trials (E): half-full glass; Unequal distribution trials (U): full glass) (see Fig. 2c).  
Afterwards, the windows illuminated again with a chime (Fig. 2d), only this time the milk 
was poured from the other window to the glass next to the other teddy bear (again 3 seconds) (see 
Fig. 2e). Once this action is finished, the distributor leaves the scene. In all trials, the distributor 
poured always the same total amount of milk but, depending on the trail type, the milk was either 
divided equally or very unequally (see final outcomes in Fig. 2f).  
Finally, infants were presented with the images of the two agents (fair and unfair), one on 
the left and the other on the right of the monitor, to assess infant’s visual preferences for one of the 
two agents.  
Looking behavior analysis 
We measured Anticipatory looks for the second distribution trial , and looking times for the 
final outcomes and for the visual preference. The anticipatory looks were recorded the moment the 
second time both windows lighted up. We analyzed which side infants expected the jug to exit by 
the first window infants looked at: do infants anticipate that some milk would be given to the teddy 
bear that had received none? After the second distribution of milk, the distributor left the scene. 
From this moment, looking times were coded until infants looked away from the scene for more 
than 2 consecutive seconds or 60 seconds elapsed. Infants were shown four test trials, two with 
equal distributions and two with unequal distributions. Trials were presented in two test orders (Test 
order 1: EUUE; Test order 2: UEEU). The same distributor (fair agent) always performed the equal 
distributions, while the unequal ones by the other distributor (unfair agent). Test order, the identity 
of the fair agent (the agent with the pink or orange visor), the side of entrance and the side of the 
first delivery were counterbalanced across participants.  
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Visual preference task 
Infants when presented with the images of the two agents or actresses (fair and unfair) after 
the final trial, their visual preference for one of the two agents were recorded. The position of the 
fair and unfair distributors was counterbalanced across participants.  
Manual choice task 
After the end of the movies, a manual choice task was presented. Infants were shown 
two 7.3 x 5.5 cm polystyrene shapes with pictures of the distributors. These pictures were 
placed in front of the infant using a 32 x 21 cm white tray. Infants, after 5 seconds from the 
presentation of the two agents, were encouraged to choose one by the following verbal prompt: 
“Come on, pick one”. In this way, the child could express her/his preference for the fair or 
unfair agent by touching or picking up the agent of her/his choice. Caregivers were instructed 
not to interfere with infants’ choice. The side of the fair donor was the same as in the visual 
preference task. The inter-judges agreement was 100%.  
3.2.2 Results 
Anticipatory looks. For this measure we recorded the first anticipatory looks during the 
illumination of the windows preceding the second resource allocation. As can be seen in Table 1, 
infants who anticipated the second resource allocation did not show any significant bias in their 
anticipatory looks (two-choice binomial test, two tailed, all ps >. 63). In the first trial, 75% of 
infants (N = 24) anticipated the following resource allocation, p = .007, two-choice binomial test, 
two tailed. In addition, all tests on the association between the type of distribution (equal vs. 
unequal) and the side of the first anticipatory look were not significant (two-tailed Fisher’s exact 
test, all ps > .2).  
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Figure 2. Video sequence of test trials in the distribution phase. (a) The agent enters the scene; (b) the two windows 
illuminated and, simoultaneusly, a chime rings; (c) the agent pours some milk into one of the glasses; in the equal 
distribution trails, the glass is half filled, while in the unequal distribution trials, the glass is fully filled; (d) the windows 
illuminates again; (e) the distributor pours some milk in the second glass; in the equal distribution trials the glass is half 
filled, while in the unequal distribution trials only a very small quantity of milk is poured in the second glass; (f) final 
outcomes of the distributive actions.  
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Table 1  
First Anticipatory looks. 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition, the average times infants spent looking at the windows during the illumination 
of the windows preceding the second resource allocation were compared. This analysis was 
conducted excluding 5 outliers. The time spent looking at the window above the filled glass (M = 
.19; SD = .26) was longer than that spent on the window above the empty glass (M = .09; SD = 
.10), t(27) = 2.24, p = .033, η2 = .16 (Fig. 3). This result suggests that the presence of milk was an 
attractor that affected infants’ preferences for one side of the visual field. 
 
Figure 3.  Anticipatory looks. Comparison between the average times infants spent looking at the windows above the 
empty vs. filled glass during the illumination of the windows preceding the second resource allocation. 
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Trial Distribution type 
First anticipatory look 
Empty glass Filled glass 
No 
anticipation 
1 
Equal (half full glass) 6 5 5 
Unequal (full glass) 7 6 3 
2 
Equal (half full glass) 4 7 5 
Unequal (full glass) 4 4 8 
3 
Equal (half full glass) 3 7 6 
Unequal (full glass) 7 4 5 
4 
Equal (half full glass) 4 6 6 
Unequal (full glass) 3 4 9 
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Looking times. Considering the outcome of the equal and the unequal distributions, we were 
interested in analyzing if there was a difference in the mean time infants spent looking at both 
outcomes. No significant effect was found (p >.05). Similar results were obtained when 2 outliers 
were excluded because looking times more than 2 SD from the mean.  
Visual preference task. In order to verify the existence of a preference for one of the two 
agents (fair vs. unfair) we compared the average time infants looked to one or the other. The 
analysis was conducted not considering the five outliers. No significant difference in the mean time 
spent looking at the (M = 2.84, SD = 1.73) or unfair (M = 2.93, SD = 2.09) donor was found, t(27) 
= 0.35, p = 0.73. 
Manual choice task. The analysis on the explicit answers indicating a preference for the fair 
or unfair distributor did not show any significant effect (N = 16, fair distributor = 9, unfair 
distributor = 7, two-choice binomial test, two tailed, p = .80). 
This study shows that the 11-month-olds do not anticipate a visually equal or unequal 
distribution of resources. This result seems to have been influenced by the visual elements of the 
scene (black / white contrast and attractiveness of milk) that, at this age, could be dominant over the 
early-sense of fairness. 11-month-olds have not even shown a post-dictive expectation with respect 
to the fairness of resource allocation. Since the sense of distributive justice is a skill that develops 
with age, we replicated the study with an older sample of infants. 
3.3 Study 2 
This study aims at investigating the expectation of a fair distribution in children of 15 
months using the same experimental paradigm used with children 11 months of the previous study. 
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3.3.1 Method 
3.3.1.1 Participants 
Sixteen 15-month olds (6 females; mean age = 459.13 days, SD = 31.30; range = 408-509 
days) were included in the study. Furthermore, 2 infants were excluded for fuzziness. Parents gave 
their written consent to the study. 
3.3.1.2 Materials and procedure 
See the “Materials and Procedure” part in Study 1. 
3.3.2 Results 
Anticipatory looks. First anticipatory looks during the illumination of the windows 
preceding the second resource allocation was also coded. Table 2 shows the number of infants who 
anticipated an equal or unequal resource allocation. No significant bias in the anticipatory looks of 
the infants who anticipated the distribution was found (two-choice binomial test, two tailed, all ps 
>. 15).  
In the first and fourth trial 88% of the infants (N = 14) anticipated the resource allocation, p 
= .004, two-choice binomial test, two tailed. All tests on the association between the type of 
distribution (equal vs. unequal) and the side of the first anticipatory look were not significant (two-
tailed Fisher’s exact test, all ps > .2).  
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Table 2 
First Anticipatory looks 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, Infants spent more time looking at the window above the filled glass (M = 1.26; 
SD = .19) that on the above the empty glass (M = .58; SD = .59), t(14) = 2.64, p = .02, η2 = .33 
(Fig. 4). The analysis was conducted not considering the outlier. Once again, the attraction exerted 
by the milk and the visual contrast has captured infants’ attention.  
 
Figure 4. Anticipatory looks. Comparison between the average times infants spent looking at the windows above the 
empty vs. filled glass during the illumination of the windows preceding the second resource allocation. 
Looking times. Infants looked at unequal distributions (M = 5.75; SD = 3.28) reliably longer 
than at equal distributions (M = 3.93; SD = 2.06), t(14) = 3.0, p = .024, η2 = .315 (Fig. 5). One 
subject was not considered in the analysis because it was an outlier. 
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Trial Distribution type 
First anticipatory look 
Empty 
glass 
Filled 
glass 
No 
anticipation 
1 
Equal (half full glass) 4 2 2 
Unequal (full glass) 3 5 0 
2 
Equal (half full glass) 3 4 1 
Unequal (full glass) 0 5 3 
3 
Equal (half full glass) 1 2 5 
Unequal (full glass) 1 3 4 
4 
Equal (half full glass) 4 3 1 
Unequal (full glass) 4 3 1 
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Figure 5. Mean looking times infants spent in the distribution outcomes (equal vs. unequal outcome). 
Visual Preference task. No significant difference in the time infants spent on the fair or 
unfair distributor (p >.05). The same result was obtained also excluding the outlier. 
Manual choice task. The analysis of the infants’ answers indicating a preference for the fair 
or unfair distributor picking up one of the two agents did not show any significant effect (N = 11, 
fair distributor = 5, unfair distributor = 6, two-choice binomial test, two tailed, n.s.). 
3.4 Discussion 
This study was designed to investigate infants’ sense of fairness in a resource allocation task 
of continuous resources. In line with previous works (Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011; Sommerville, 
et al., 2013), we found that 15-month-olds revealed to be able to evaluate agents and to have an 
expectation for equitable allocations of resources when observing the final outcome of test events. 
In fact, when this expectation was disregarded, infants spent more time observing the outcome of 
the distribution (i.e. followed the VOE paradigm). This expectation did not emerge with 11-month- 
olds.  
 Furthermore, infants of both ages did not look preferentially to one of the two illuminated 
windows showing no anticipation of the second resource allocation. Moreover, infants showed to be 
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sensible to the attraction exerted by the glass previously filled with milk suggesting that the 
presence of milk was an attractor that affected infants’ preferences for one side of the visual field. 
Both age groups did not show any preference for the any of the actresses when visually or manually 
choosing between their images.   
These findings are consistent with similar works that have also provided evidence that using 
an anticipatory looking measure to demonstrate children’s expectations is not effective at this age 
(Geraci & Surian, 2011; Neira-Gutiérrez, Franchin, Savazzi, Surian, in prep.; Southgate et al., 
2007). Even by making movies with a realistic setting, with a similar effective procedure that also 
used an anticipatory looking paradigm (Southgate et al., 2007), we still did not observe this type of 
behavior at this stage of development.  
To investigate the developmental change, we could observe, with our sample of 11-month-
olds and our sample of 15-month-olds who were tested with the same VOE paradigm, that the 
results of this study provides important information regarding the developmental trajectory of 
infants’ fairness expectations. Considering 15-month-olds looked reliably longer to the unequal 
outcomes in the experimental condition of the VOE paradigm, 11-month-olds looked equally to 
both outcomes. These findings reveal that there are in fact age-related changes between 11- and 15-
month in infants’ expectations regarding how resources are typically distributed. Additionally, 15-
month-old infants were more attentive to the outcomes in the VOE than 11-month-olds. We think 
that it is improbable that differences in infants’ overall attention to the outcomes across age groups 
accounted for the observed differences in infants’ looking preferences across ages for a few reasons. 
First, infants in both age groups were equally attentive to the distribution phase (attraction exerted 
by the glass previously filled with milk), revealing that both age groups were engaged in the task. 
Second, past work has suggested that infants discriminate test outcomes at 12 months in habituation 
paradigms when overall attention levels are equivalent (see Sommerville & Woodward, 2005). 
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Third, 11-month-old infants’ overall attention to the final outcomes was unrelated to the degree of 
their preference for the unequal outcome, claiming that the effect is independent of infants’ overall 
attention.  
Do we have enough evidence that proves humans possess spontaneous 
evaluation skills that are applied to agents’ distributive actions? Indeed, there has been a long line 
of evidence in recent years (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Hamlin, 2013; Meristo & Surian, 2013; Meristo 
& Surian, 2014; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011; Sloane et al., 2012; Sommerville et al., 2013) that 
proves this point. We then can, once again provide supportive evidence that infants in their second 
year of life are able to evaluate distributive actions and present specific expectations for equitable 
allocations of resources. Our results, revealing an early idea of justice in the second year of life, are 
coherent with the recent theoretical models that supported the role of the biological equipment and 
the innate origin of moral sense (Hauser, 2006; Dupoux & Jacob, 2007). These theories claimed the 
moral sense derives from a ‘universal moral grammar’, which is based on innate knowledge 
characterized by some universal principles that guide moral judgments unconsciously and 
automatically (Hauser, 2006). And a ‘moral faculty’, that is based on moral instincts and automatic 
emotional reactions (Dupoux & Jacob, 2007). 
In sum, our findings contribute to topics that have already been studied using resource 
allocation tasks revealing early moral intuitions.  
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Chapter 4 
 
How infants approach fair and unfair distributors: Do they prefer helping a fair 
distributor rather than an unfair one? 
Federica Savazzi, Isabel C. Neira-Gutiérrez, Laura Franchin, Luca Surian 
(In preparation) 
 
Abstract 
 
In developmental psychology, the early development of prosocial behavior has become a broad 
topic. Previous studies revealed that the earliest instances of human helping behavior show 
specificity. In this study, we tested 20- and 30-month-olds to see whether after observing an equal 
and unequal resource allocation task there were differences in helping behaviors after observing a 
fair and an unfair resource allocation task. We found yet again that the human ability to engage in 
helping behaviors begins early in development; however, there is no evidence of a tendency by 
associating equal and unequal distributive actions with helping behaviors. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Children begin to engage in pro-social behaviors in their second year of life (Dunfield & 
Kuhlmeier, 2010; Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom & Mahajan, 2011; Paulus, 2014; Warneken & Tomasello, 
2007). Prosocial behavior is defined as the intervening, beneficial actions that are preceded by the 
direct observation or inference of another’s negative state (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2013; Dunfield, 
2014; Warneken, 2013). These negative states include instrumental need (Instrumental need being 
when an individual is having difficulty finishing a goal-directed behavior such as retrieving an out 
of reach object, and another individual can interfere by helping), material desire (when an 
individual does not have a desired resource, e.i. toy or cookie, and another individual can interfere 
by sharing), and emotional distress (when an individual is experiencing a negative emotional state, 
and another individual can interfere by comforting). Helping and sharing have been the focus of 
most of the research work to date on prosocial behavior; in this study, particularly we will be 
studying children’s helping intentions after an equal or unequal resource distribution task. 
Recent scientific findings (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2010; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011; 
Warneken & Tomasello, 2006) made it possible to reveal how helping behaviors and the 
understanding of fairness in resource distributions, both in man and chimpanzees, seems to be 
influenced by some particular situations such as the presence of a previous positive interactions 
(Hamlin, Wynn and Bloom, 2007), the understanding of the difference between inability and 
unwillingness to provide (Behne, Carpenter, Call & Tomasello, 2005 as cited in Dunfield & 
Kuhlmeier, 2010).  
A study conducted by Dunfield and Kuhlmeier (2010), where they observed in 21-month-
olds the tendency to apply helping behaviors to someone as a result of a willing or an unwilling 
attempt to provide a toy. The aim of the study was to give more light to the nature and specificity of 
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the help provided by the children, in particular situations. They were presented with three different 
experimental situations, each of which is characterized by a difficulty, for example, when the falling 
of a toy impossible to recover for the two actresses who were behind a box, the two actresses 
simultaneously reached for the toy with outstretched arms, maintaining neutral expressions and not 
making eye contact with the participant. Infants were given an opportunity to retrieve the toy and 
give it to one of the actresses. Afterwards, the actresses expected the implementation of a helping 
behavior from the child, who, handed the toy to one of them, it did make a choice that was decoded 
as the preference for a type of behavior. The study found that children enact on helping behaviors, 
based mainly on experience and on the intentions of the person asking for help. Precisely for this 
purpose, in our work, we used a similar scenario, in which two actresses were distributing resources 
fairly (fair actress) or unfairly (unfair actress) and simultaneously asked to be helped with 
outstretched arms to pick up a ball. At the end of the scene, they finally offered the child two 
cookies, one for themselves and one to be delivered to an actress of their choice. In this way, it was 
possible to analyze the behavior of help in the delivery of the ball and the choice made by giving a 
gift in two different age groups. In addition to these two dependent variables, the influence of other 
variables on the choice made by children, such as sex, response times, the age of entry to the day-
cares and the number of siblings was also analyzed.  
In our study, we wanted to investigate whether there are differences in helping behaviors 
(delivery of ball and cookie) in children of two different age groups (20 months vs. 30 months), 
after observing a fair and an unfair resource allocation task. We expected to find a greater trend in 
manifesting helping behaviors and in giving awards to the fair distributor in the 30 months group. 
Some studies (Blake & Rand, 2010; Warneken, Lohse, Melis, Tomasello, 2011) claimed that the 
experience of socialization, the sharing and implementation of cooperative activities, have an 
influence on the implementation of collaborative behavior and help, so it is possible that the older 
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children, having lived probably more socialization experiences in the day-cares, manifest stronger 
helping behaviors and favor the fair distributor than younger children. It is also assumed that the 
‘number of brothers’, ‘age of enrollment to the day-cares’ and ‘sex’ influence the choices made by 
the children. 
In particular, the greater the number of brothers and the lower the age of enrollment to the 
day-cares, the more frequent helping behaviors and awards should be given out to fair distributors, 
since it can be assumed that the presence of brothers and an early enrollment to the day-cares take 
the child to have more socialization experiences and then be more exposed to helping and awarding 
behaviors. Finally, we expected that there may be a difference between girls’ and boys’ behaviors, 
since in literature girls seem to base their judgment on aspects most spontaneous and empathetic 
than boys that are mainly based on rights and duties (i.e., Gilligan, 1982). 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
The experiment was conducted with 41 children enrolled in private and public day-cares in 
the province of Trento, mostly Italians, divided into two experimental groups according to age and 
homogeneous with respect to the variable gender. 17 children were excluded from the study, 4 by 
procedural errors and 13 because they did not complete the required task. 
The first group consisted of 19 children aged between 18 and 25 months (M = 20:16; SD = 
1.80), the ‘20 months’ group. The 47.4% (9) were males mostly Italians (94.7%) and a majority 
(55.6%) were inserted to the day-cares between 16 and 18 months. In addition, it was also found to 
contain a family of brothers, 7 of them are only children, 10 have a brother and only 2 (10.5%) have 
two or more siblings. The second group consisted of 22 children aged between 27 and 32 months 
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(M = 29.45; SD = 1.74), the ‘30 months’ group. 45.5% (10) males are mostly Italian (86.4%) and 
most of them (68.1%) were inserted to the day-cares between 10 and 15 months. In addition, it was 
also found to contain a family of brothers: 5 of them are only children, 11 have a brother and 6 
(27.3%) have two or more siblings. 
Participants were contacted in different day-cares of the town of Rovereto. Parents of 
children were given a letter of presentation of the study, which explained the procedure and purpose 
of the research, and a written consent form for the processing of sensitive data.  
4.2.2 Materials  
We modeled our procedure around the work conducted by Dunfield and Kuhlmeier (2010). 
The experimental apparatus (see Fig. 1) consisted of two cardboard boxes (33 x 77.5 x 31 cm) 
covered by a black sticky paper, elevated from the ground with three triangular shaped wooden 
pieces (9 x 30 cm) that helped tilt the boxes, making the setting more visible to the child who had to 
sit at the front center at a distance of 80 cm on the legs of their teacher. A red pillow (42 x 42 x 5 
cm) was used to indicate the exact point where they had to sit. The perimeter of the two boxes was 
bordered by a strip of white color to define the specific space for each actor, and each box had two 
small openings on the inclined upper part (8 x 11.5 cm), 11.5 cm away from the perimeter, where 
two incorporated dolls were present. Under each doll a wooden stick (2 x 20 x 1.5 cm) was applied 
to reach a height of 4.5cm, that is 5 cm from the perimeter of the box, to help support the resources 
that were being distributed, so that these remain visible throughout the test events. 
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Figure 1. Image of the experimental setting 
 
The boxes were positioned by joining the interior front angles, so it is slightly rotated 
towards the child. The resources were distributed to four identical fabric dolls (26 x 19 x 11.5 cm), 
two for each actress. The resources were four cookies (3.5 x 8 x 0.5 cm) and four candies (3.5 x 7.5 
cm). The ball used (9 cm diameter) was coated with a soft and colorful leather like material, and did 
not bounce. Children were also videotaped using two video cameras (Panasonic SDR-H20, Sony 
handycam DCR-HC27E), one in front and one behind the child and two tripod stands (Manfrotto, h 
50 cm). 
4.2.3 Procedure 
The experiment was carried out in an environment familiar to the child, usually in a quiet 
room of the day-care, where the experimental apparatus was set up. All the people involved were: 
1) Experimenter: introducing the child to the experimental scenario, 2) ‘Fair’ actress ‘Unfair’ 
actress: they carried out the distribution of resources, 3) Teacher or educator: held the child in their 
arms, 4) Child: watched and carried out choices. 
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After an initial greeting an habituation phase was carried out, in which the experimenter 
familiarized the teacher with the procedure and their role. The child was presented with a short 
game conducted by the experimenter: all the people involved sat in a circle and passed the colorful 
ball either clockwise or counterclockwise; the role of the two actresses in the game was similar but 
secondary to that of the experimenter, without interacting directly, so there was no influence in their 
choice during the distribution phase. After finishing the game, the two actresses are positioned to 
one side, usually behind the child for not being noticed. Testing began after switching on the 
cameras that reflected the scene at the front and back of the child. 
Testing events consisted of three phases, familiarization phase, distribution phase and 
experimental phase. The familiarization phase started with the experimenter positioned behind the 
two cardboard boxes centrally, she presented the four dolls holding them in a hand and simulating 
an interaction between them, later placing them in the openings of the boxes facing the child. The 
dolls were presented two at a time as sisters, the experimenter explained: "These are two sisters, 
Chiara and Silvia. Hello Chiara!, hello Silvia! watch how they play together "; "These are two 
sisters, Clara and Sara. Hello Clara!, hello Sara! watch how they play together ". After finishing the 
positioning of the dolls in the openings, the experimenter played toss with the colored ball for a few 
seconds, tossing it upwards two times, saying "And now again the colored ball!" and making it 
accidentally fall in front of the child. Subsequently, she reached for the ball as if to pick it up, 
moving her fingers as sign of wanting to grab the ball, and asked the child: "Oh no! Help me. I 
dropped the ball, can you help me? ". In order to assist the child, the experimenter turned the palm 
upwards. Once the ball was returned to the experimenter, she thanked the child and hid the ball 
behind the scene, announcing the entry of the two actresses: "Now, mothers of these sisters play 
with us".  
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While the actresses are positioned centrally behind the two boxes, the experimenter moved 
away from the scene, and stood behind the teacher, in order to hide from the child, this marked the 
beginning of the distribution phase. Each actress before starting their respective distributions rotated 
the dolls so that the faces were directed towards them so that the interaction during distributions 
proves as real. The distribution of resources (cookies and candies) occurred after the familiarization 
phase, where, in the case of an equal distribution, the actress said: "Hello girls, (actress addressing 
to the dolls) I have two cookies what do I do with them? (Both cookies were placed at the center of 
the box, easily visible to the child) This cookie I give to you and this other cookie I give to you (the 
actress kept eye contact with dolls, and the cookies were placed above the wooden stick placed on 
the box, so that the child could always observe how the distribution happened)”; In the case of an 
unfair distribution the actress said: " Hello girls, (actress addressing to the dolls) I have two cookies 
what do I do with them? This cookie I give to you and this other cookie again to you (the actress 
distributed both resources to one doll only), and to you nothing! (actress referring to the doll that 
had not received a cookie to mark the difference)". The same dialogue was used for candies, 
omitting the initial greeting. The position of the actresses, the type of distribution and the order of 
presentation was all counterbalanced across participants. At the end of all distributions (for a total 
of four), the resources were dropped into the small opening of the box where dolls were positioned, 
so they were not visible to the child anymore.  
Subsequently both actresses rotated, so as to be opposite one another, and the last actress to 
carry out the fourth distribution took the colored ball, used in the familiarization phase, initiating an 
exchange of tosses between both actresses, this marked the beginning of the experimental phase. 
This moment was introduced by a dialogue between both actresses: "And now we play together?” 
(speaking simultaneously) Actresses tossed the ball 4 times to each other and at the same time said, 
"and that's enough! This we put it here!". Together they placed the ball in the middle of both boxes 
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and drop it, making it seem as if it was an accident and said: " Oh no! Help us!” (see Fig. 2). The 
actresses looks were directed to the ball, avoiding eye contact with the child, having a neutral 
expression and carrying out simultaneously an attempt to reach for the ball, keeping a distance of 
about 30 cm from the ball, in order to not influence the choice of the child. Only when the child 
held the ball, both actresses could extend the hand forward, and turn their palm upwards, as to 
indicate, nonverbally, where the child has to deliver.  
Figure 2. Example of scene after actresses tossed each other the ball. The ball subsequently fell to the floor. The two 
actresses simultaneously reached for the toy with outstretched arms, maintaining neutral expressions and not making   
eye contact with the participant. Infants were given an opportunity to retrieve the toy and give it to one of the actresses. 
 
Once the child delivered the ball, the actress who received the ball hid it behind the box, 
meanwhile the experimenter walked next to the child and delivered two cookies, one by one, 
saying: "Now this is for you and this other cookie to whom would you give it to? To her or to her?". 
When the experimenter asked "to her or to her" the two actresses who are still behind the boxes, 
held out their arms and turn their palm upwards again, always without having any eye contact with 
the child. In the event that the child does not take part voluntarily, the educator was asked to help 
out, always without indicating any of the actresses: "Help them! Help them catch the ball!", or “To 
who would you give the cookie to. To her or her? ", and also by helping the child to get up to catch 
the ball or hand over the cookie. After the child handed the cookie to one of the two actresses, the 
distribution phase had ended and the cameras were turned off.  
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4.3 Results 
Given the small sample size we opted for a set of non-parametric analysis to describe the 
characteristics of the two groups of participants (20 months vs. 30 months). To verify the 
differences between the two groups of children (N = 41), a number of statistical tests on the median 
and means were performed. The comparison between children of 20 months and those of 30 months 
in relation to the delivery of the ball against the actress who performs a fair distribution or the 
actress who performs an unfair distribution was not significant (Mann -Whitney, U = 202, z = -.213, 
p = .831, r = .03). 
Unlike the previous data related to the delivery of the ball task, the comparison between 
children of 20 months and those of 30 months in relation to the delivery of the cookie was 
significant between the actress who performs a fair distribution and the actress who performs an 
unfair distribution (see Fig. 3), (Mann-Whitney U = 126, z = -2.35, p = .019, r = .37). This 
significance is also supported by an effect size of moderate amplitude. 20-month-olds seem to 
choose more consistently the actress that made a fair distribution of resources, compared to older 
children that did not differ in choice. The presence of this data leads to assume that the child has 
attributed a different importance to both tasks (ball delivery and cookie delivery) as the first was on 
providing help in a difficult situation, and the second was to reward spontaneously one of two 
actresses by giving them a cookie. 
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Figure 3. The graph shows the distribution of 20 and 30 months old children when delivering the cookie to actresses 
who carried out a fair or unfair distribution of resources. 
 
The time spent by children in delivering the ball and cookie was also analyzed. The two 
groups of participants, were compared to response times of the two tasks, the delivery of the ball 
and cookie differ in response time to the first task, the delivery of the ball (U = 92.5, z = -3,054, p = 
.002, r = .48), However, in the delivery of the cookie there was no significant difference (U = 135.5, 
z = -1,465, p = .143, r = .22). Older children are quicker to respond to stimuli with an effect size 
close to the threshold of .50, this indicates a large effect. Note that the 20 months group take more 
time in the first task, which is drastically reduced in the second. This data, although not statistically 
significant, shows a learning effect in task participation; especially it shows an increase in the 
children’s response behavior because they, in terms of time, seem less inhibited in the second task 
to approach the actresses with respect to the first task. 
Furthermore, both age groups differ significantly in the age of enrollment to the day-cares 
(U = 110.5, W = 363.5, z = -2,586, p = .010, r = 0:40). The 30-month-olds, as seen in Figure 4, 
joined the day-cares at an earlier age than the 20-month-olds (the median age the younger age group 
enrolled to the day-cares was 16 months, while the median of the older age group was 12 months). 
Also in this case the amplitude of the effect is moderate. 
* 
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Figure 4. The graph shows the distribution of frequencies of the two experimental groups according to the age in which 
they enrolled to the day-cares. 
 
We calculated zero-order correlations for variables of experimental interest (delivery of the 
ball to the actress carrying out a fair distribution, delivery of the cookie to actress carrying out a fair 
distribution, gender, age of enrollment to the day-cares, number of brothers or sisters). As seen on 
Table 1, the variables analyzed are not significantly correlated (p <.05). Specifically, the delivery of 
the ball to fair actress is not significantly correlated with either gender, nor with the age of 
enrollment to the day-care or with the number of siblings (see column 1). In Table 2, it is possible 
to observe the presence of a significant correlation (p <.05). Specifically, the delivery of the cookie 
to the fair actress is negatively correlated with the age of enrollment to the day-care (tau = -.212, p 
<.05). There was no indication of any influence of the variable "Sex" on the variables investigated 
as can be seen, both in Table 1 and in Table 2, Line 2. 
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Table 1 
Correlations between independent variables and the dependent variable "Delivery of ball to fair actress". 
 
Table 2 
Correlations between independent variables and the dependent variable "Delivery of cookie to fair actress 
 
For further analysis, we have the following results on a possible similarity in the delivery of 
the ball and the delivery of the cookie (see Fig. 5). From the original 41 subjects, 7 were excluded 
because they had not completed the task, or because they delivered both cookies to both actresses (n 
= 4), for a total of 34 subjects. We observed which actress children had the tendency to deliver the 
resources and if they showed a certain consistency in the delivery, or if by having delivered the ball 
to the actress who had made the fair distribution tended to give her two cookies. The results showed 
Non-parametric correlations 
    1 2 3 
1 Delivery of ball to fair actress 1.000 
  2 Sex .034 1.000 
 3 Age of enrollment -.062 -.157 1.000 
4 Number of brothers and sisters -.147 -.192 .014 
Note: N = 41;  Kendall's tau_b ; Degrees of freedom = 39; * = p < .05. 
 
Non-parametric correlations 
    1 2 3 
1 Delivery of cookie to fair actress 1.000 
  
2 Sex .106 1.000 
 
3 Age of enrollment -.212* -.157 1.000 
4 Number of brothers and sisters .059 -.192 .14 
Note: N = 41;Kendall's tau_b ; Degrees of freedom= 39; * = p < .05.   
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that 20-month-olds showed a significant consistency in carrying out the delivery of resources ( χ² 
(2) = 3.85, p = .05; Cohen's d = .70), compared with the group of 30-month-olds; the d of Cohen 
indicates a strong effect for both groups, while the value of p is significant to the limit. Younger 
children, therefore, delivered and gave the resources to the same actress, carrying out a distribution 
such as "delivery of the ball to Fair actress – delivery of cookie to Fair actress" or "delivery of the 
ball to Unfair actress – delivery of the cookie to Unfair actress". The delivery of resources by 
children of 20 months is, therefore, independent of the type of distribution that the actresses 
exhibited. Unlike the 20-month-olds, the 30-month-olds tended to evenly distribute available 
resources between the two actresses: if the first resource was delivered to the actress who had done 
a fair or unfair distribution, the second resource was delivered to the actress who had not received 
anything in the first part of the task.  
 
Figure 5.The graph represents the distribution of frequencies of the delivery of the ball and cookie conducted by 20-
month-olds and 30-month-olds, depending on the type of distribution performed by the actresses. Each index consists of 
two acronyms: the first one is related to the delivery of the ball to the actress who made a fair (F) or unfair (U) 
distribution, while the second refers to the delivery of the cookie actress who carried out one of two types of 
distribution. 
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4.4 Discussion 
The results of this study do not confirm the experimental hypotheses initially proposed by 
us. Specifically, we did not find any behavioral difference between the two age groups, both in the 
helping task or in the giving a resource task after observing a resource allocation task (2 types: 
equal and unequal distributions). One possible interpretation for these results may be because 
children do not use the criteria of choice suggested by us, also along with the fact that the task 
assigned to them may be complex for the way in which it was presented. In fact, children in both 
age groups, provided the helping behavior requested by the actresses to recover the ball, showing an 
effective capacity to manifest this behavior from 18 months as confirmed by some studies in 
literature (Dunfield, Kuhlmeier, O’Connell, Kelley, 2011; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). The 
aspect that, for various reasons, is not fully understood concerns the second part of the task or the 
delivery of the resource to the actress who did a fair distribution. It is probable that by asking 
children to make a choice or deliver a cookie based on preference for an equal distribution of 
resources is a task too difficult to acquire (Kuhlmeier, Dunfield, O’Neill, 2014). One possible 
reason that this study did not find evidence for preferential choice of an equal distribution of 
resources in these particular age groups is simply that these children did not understand the social 
interaction that was enacted, and thus could not form an evaluation on which to base their 
selectivity. Another consideration about the explanation of our results concerns a procedural aspect, 
specifically the moment when the actresses conclude the distribution of resources and begin the 
game with the ball. We have reflected on the possibility that the introduction of this new task 
distracts children from the previous scenarios or the distributive actions conducted by the actresses 
towards the dolls. Children, therefore, in providing the help required by the actresses, that is to 
deliver the ball, does not seem to take into account the previous distributions, where the situation 
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was the final distribution of type 2: 2 (equal distribution) and 4: 0 (unequal distribution), confirming 
the idea that the criteria of choice used by the child for the delivery of the ball was random.  
Which motivations may play a role in early prosociality? Empathic responding is the option 
most commonly discussed. Although, in studies where 1-year-olds show helping behaviors in 
situations where no emotional emotion is displayed (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006), and evidence 
of neural correlates associated with emotion-based processes are not associated with helping 
behaviors (Paulus, Gillis, Li, Moore, 2013), this description seems questionable in the case of 
helping. However, there is evidence for affect sharing and emotional contagion in infants. 
Consequently, it is possible that early comforting is based on emotional contagion and, at least to 
some extent or in some cultures, supported by empathic concern (Decety & Svetlova, 2012). With 
regard to helping, the situation is less clear. Given that helping is not based on any emotional 
expression of the other and is presented before the person being helped recognizes their need 
themselves (Warneken, 2013), empathic concern is less probable to be the motivating factor. This 
reveals that processes of goal alignment (Kenward & Gredebäck, 2013) or a motivation to engage 
with another may play a role in the emergence of helping. 
Interestingly, in the experimental phase, 20-month-olds tend to deliver the cookie at the 
same actress, regardless of the type of distribution that she presents; 30-month-olds instead tend to 
even out the distribution so that each of the two actresses receive at least one resource. The behavior 
performed by the 30-month-olds can be explained by the evolution of the sense of fairness and 
justice. In literature, the presence of the emerging sense of fairness and justice in infants is widely 
studied in developmental psychology (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Hamlin, 2013; Sloane, Baillargeon, 
Premack, 2012; Sommerville, Schmidt, Yun & Burns, 2013). Considering, as a limitation of our 
study, the limited involvement by the participant to the distributive actions, we see how actively the 
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child makes a fair distribution of resources to the two actresses, confirming even more effective the 
early development of a sense of fairness. 
In conclusion, given the present results and those from other studies, it is clear that the 
human ability to engage in helping behaviors begins early in development. Additionally, we 
understood that it might be distracting for children to relate to what was taking place on the 
resource allocation task, to form an evaluation on which to base their selectivity for a helping 
behavior. For this reason, our findings suggest that there is no sign of a tendency by associating 
equal and unequal distributive actions with helping behaviors yet at 30 months of age.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Do infants map the word 'good' to moral qualities? 
Laura Franchin, Isabel C. Neira-Gutiérrez, Federica Savazzi, Luca Surian 
(Submitted) 
 
Abstract 
 
We report 20- and 30-months-olds’ knowledge of the word 'good' in the two core domains of moral 
reasoning: fairness and harm. Previous literature reveals infants’ sensibility to these two domains in 
the first year of life; however, no other study has investigated whether infants’ emerging moral 
competence is also mapped early onto an appropriate lexical item in the second year of life. We 
studied infants’ manual choice responses towards agents that perform fair/helping actions or 
unfair/hindering actions. Our results provide evidence that even if there is an already established 
emerging sense of fairness and harm in 20-month-old infants, these concepts are not yet correctly 
mapped at a linguistic level until 30 months for the harm domain, and later for the fairness domain. 
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5.1 Introduction 
'Good' is an interesting word that is used in a variety of contexts. It is the most general term of 
approval and it is used as an adjective, a noun, an interjection, and an adverb. Thus, there will be 
lexical readings for each of these types of occurrence (Katz, 1964). This famous author in the 
philosophy of language also wrote that: “Whereas the meaning of a word such as 'bachelor', 
'honest', 'hard', 'cuts', 'liquid', etc. is made up of component elements that are attributes in their own 
right, the meaning of 'good' is a function that operates on other meanings, not an independent 
attribute. Apart from combination with the conceptual content of other words and expressions, the 
meaning of 'good' does not make sense. Since the meaning of 'good' cannot stand alone as a 
complete concept, we shall say that the meaning of 'good' is syncategorematic” (p. 763). 
Concurrent with this lexical complexity, the word 'good' is also a word highly heard and easy 
to learn by children (e.g., “You are a good boy!”, “Good job!”, “Is the food good?”). By 24 months, 
most children use a number of adjectives in their everyday speech and appear to understand that, in 
so doing, they are referring to the properties of things (Mintz & Gleitman, 2002). Between 18 and 
20 months, children first produce word combinations as a “telegraphic speech”. Before they can 
produce many words, children acquire a significant comprehension vocabulary (Benedict, 1979; 
Fenson, Dale, Reznick, Bates, Thal, & Pethick, 1994; Friedlander, 1970; Hutternlocher, 1974; 
Shipley, Smith, & Gleitman, 1969). So, there is an asynchrony across two different linguistic 
domains that involves comprehension and production. For example, Benedict (1979) reported that 
14-month-olds’ spoken vocabulary size is only 10 words, while their comprehension vocabulary 
seems to be 50 words, as reported by their parents. Furthermore, the ability to learn arbitrary 
association between words and objects appears to develop rapidly at about 14 months of age 
(Werker, Cohen, Lloyd, Casasola, & Stager, 1998). 
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Therefore, the second year of life seems to be a critical period to investigate the evolution of 
infants’ appreciation of the links between words and the world (Booth & Waxman, 2003), and their 
growing capacity to map the words appropriately to meaning in different domains. Furthermore, the 
second year of life seems to be crucial also for the moral development. Infants display an ability to 
evaluate agents by taking into account their fairness in distributive actions (e.g., Geraci & Surian, 
2011; Meristo & Surian, 2013) and they are also able to attribute positive values to helping actions 
and negative values to hindering actions (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & 
Bloom, 2003). 
By using implicit non-verbal measures such as looking times and preferential reaching, some 
recent studies suggest a sense of fairness in infants aged between 16 and 21 months. It was shown 
that during the second year of life, infants expect goods and resources to be allocated equally to 
recipients, they prefer agents that perform fair/equal distributions, and expect other agents to 
affiliate with or approach fair over unfair distributors (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Schmidt & 
Sommerville, 2011; Sloane, Baillargeon, & Premack, 2012; Sommerville, Schmidt, Yun, & Burns, 
2013). That is, infants’ reactions towards distributing agents differed as a function of the action 
performed by the previous fair/unfair agents’ distributions. 
Geraci and Surian (2011) showed infants aged 12 to 18 months two distributive puppets (a 
lion and a bear), two receiver puppets (a donkey and a cow) and an observer (a chicken). One 
distributive puppet gave each receiver one multicolor disk, the other gave one receiver two disks 
and the other receiver nothing. With a manual choice test, the authors demonstrated a significant 
tendency to pick up the fair rather than the unfair distributor. Schmidt and Sommerville (2011) in a 
similar way, but using actual people instead of animal puppets, showed that fifteen-month-old 
infants looked longer at the unfair distribution, suggesting that infants found this division 
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unexpected. 
Furthermore, Meristo and Surian (2013) found that at 10 months this moral evaluation is used 
when infants subsequently consider the likelihood of another agent approaching the distributor. 
Infants expect third parties to act positively towards fair donors who have distributed attractive 
resources equally between two recipients, rather than toward unfair donors who made unequal 
distributions. Infants looked longer when a reward was given to an unfair agent than when the same 
reward was given to a fair agent.  
Infants’ early social evaluations on helping and hindering behaviors, Hamlin et al. (2007) 
showed that infants as young as 10 months, after observing a wooden square helping a circle to 
reach the top of a hill and a triangle hindering the circle’s climb, reach or prefer the helping agent. 
Similar results were found also by Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom and Mahajan in 2011. The authors 
showed 8-month-old infants short events with helping or hindering puppets. Then, infants saw a 
new puppet who acted prosocially, i.e. giving a ball, or antisocially, i.e. taking away the ball, 
towards the helping and hindering puppet. Infants selectively preferred the puppet who acted 
positively toward prosocial individuals and the puppet who acted negatively towards antisocial 
individuals.  
Together, all these studies suggest that infants are sensitive to a tacit principle of fairness in 
distributive actions and to helping behaviors, sustaining that evaluative processes that support later 
selective prosociality are present just within the first year of life. 
What about the word ‘good’ itself? As mentioned in the beginning of the introduction, it is a 
general term for approval. What is interesting from the point of view of moral development, is that 
children start to apply the word ‘good’ to actions that have moral significance, such as fairness, 
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alongside other uses that are self-serving, such as something being pleasurable or tasting good. In 
abstract, there are several different meanings for the word ‘good’, or different senses of how it can 
be used. Philosophers have discussed this issue in the past, although they are mostly interested in 
the definition of the moral concept of good specifically (e.g. Korsgaard, 1983; Moore, 1903; von 
Wright, 1963), and substantial normative issues, such as how to give criteria for what counts as 
good for a given person, what does one’s wellbeing consists of (e.g. Railton, 2003; Rosati, 1996; 
Sarch, 2011).  
Defining the concept of moral good, philosophers usually stress the clear difference between 
genuinely moral good (as a normative, evaluative judgment) in contrast to something being 
instrumentally good. Moral good is a species of good of its own kind. Moore (1903) argued that 
even if we agree on what kind of things we should consider morally good, such as pleasure and 
wellbeing, we cannot define moral goodness as pleasure of wellbeing. Instead, we evaluate pleasure 
and wellbeing to be morally good. Philosophers usually agree on this. Hare (1952), for example, 
makes a sharp distinction between describing properties of something we think is good that make it 
good for us (e.g. ‘this strawberry tastes sweet’) and evaluating something good (e.g. ‘this strawberry 
is good’). He also distinguishes between instrumental and intrinsic good. Instrumentally good is 
something that is good because it has a use for achieving something else (e.g. pleasure), but 
intrinsic good is good in itself. Moral good is always intrinsic. Moreover, naturalistic properties like 
sweetness cannot be used for moral evaluation, only morally relevant properties can, and this 
depends on what kind of moral theory one adopts. 
Von Wright (1963) goes even further and analyzes a variety of different concepts of good. 
Interestingly, he does not make moral good its own category. His categories of good include such 
forms of goodness as instrumental goodness (e.g. ‘this is a good knife’), technical goodness (e.g. 
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someone being good at something), utilitarian goodness (something being useful), which includes 
being beneficial (being good for someone), medical goodness (being in good health), and hedonic 
goodness (e.g. ‘a good strawberry’). He also includes some related notions that we do not call 
‘good’, such as happiness, which means, for von Wright, being satisfied with one’s life as a whole. 
What makes something morally good for von Wright is intention. It is not enough that action has 
good consequences in any of the above sense. The action is good if the agent acts for the good of 
the other person, in any sense of the word, and this is intended without any alternative motives or 
harm. (See also Toppinen, 2013.) 
If philosophers are right about the distinctness of moral good and other senses of the word 
‘good’, then it has consequences for empirical studies on morality, too. The main consequence is 
that we cannot have an empirical theory of what moral good consists of, but maybe we can have an 
empirical theory of why people judge things to be good (Joyce, 2004). However, for the study at 
hand, the consequence is mainly positive. If moral good is its own category and not derivative from 
any instrumental sense of good that is self-serving, then the child’s tendency to apply the word 
‘good’ to the kind actions that we evaluate moral, has to be a sign of an innate tendency to evaluate 
actions good or bad on the basis of interest in morality in specific. Therefore, if we discover that 
children are capable of attaching the word ‘good’ to actions that are targeted to others and have 
morally significant properties, such as fairness or harm, we have significant evidence for innateness 
of morality. 
On the basis of this theoretical background, the aim of the present study is to investigate 20 
and 30-months-olds’ knowledge of the word 'good' in the two core domains of moral reasoning: 
fairness and harm. Established that infants are sensible to these two domains just in the first year of 
life, we want to investigate whether infants’ emerging moral competence is also mapped early onto 
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an appropriate lexical item in the second year of life, when infants have a good comprehension of 
vocabulary.  
Infants’ knowledge of the word 'good' was tested in the domain of fairness at 20 months of 
age (Experiments 1 and 2) and at 30 months of age (Experiment 5). Infants were exposed to live 
events in which an experimenter introduced infants to two teddy-bear families. Infants’ manual 
choice responses towards agents that perform fair or unfair distributions were analyzed.  
Infants’ knowledge of the word 'good' was tested in the domain of harm at 20 months of age 
(Experiment 3) and at 30 months of age (Experiment 6). Infants were presented with helping and 
hindering events with the same procedure described by Hamlin et al. (2004). Infants’ manual choice 
responses towards the helper and the hinderer agents were analyzed.  
Finally, 20-months-old infants were also tested for their knowledge of the word 'good' in the 
domain of food, as a control study. Our hypotheses were that: 1) if infants are able at 20 months or 
later at 30 months to generalize and associate a single term with different contexts, they are able to 
correctly link the term 'good' with the fair and helping behaviors, and that 2) already at 20 months 
infants know the word 'good', and they correctly associate the term to the food, because the use of 
this adjective is very usual in this context rather than in the other two domains. 
5.2 Experiment 1 
In this experiment we investigated 20-months-olds’ knowledge of the word 'good' in the 
domain of fairness. Previous research showed that in the second year of life infants prefer agents 
that distribute resources fairly rather than agents that distribute resources unfairly (e.g., Geraci & 
Surian, 2011; Meristo & Surian, 2013; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011; Sloane et al., 2012; 
Sommerville, et al., 2013). If infants’ moral competence is mapped at this age onto an appropriate 
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lexical item, we hypothesize that infants are selectively oriented towards the fair distributor when 
the task is to pick up the good one. In the contrary case, the hypothesis is that infants are not 
selectively oriented to neither of the two agents. 
5.2.1 Method 
5.2.1.1 Participants 
A group of 23 healthy full-term infants of 20 months of age (11 females, Mage = 20 months, 26 
days, age range: 17 months, 29 days to 24 months, 4 days) were recruited at local public and private 
nurseries of Trento, Italy. Seven additional infants were excluded from the study because they 
refused to participate. 
Infants were tested in a quiet room of the nurseries, only after their parents had given the 
informed consent. The entire research protocol was approved by the departmental ethic committee 
and was conducted in accordance to the principles elucidated in the Declaration of Helsinki. 
5.2.1.2 Stimuli and procedure 
Infants sat on an educator’s lap in a quiet room of the nursery. An experimenter kneeled in 
front of the infant introduced him/her to two teddy-bear families, each one composed by a bear-
mother and two cubs (see Figure 1a, b). The two families were differentiated by a bow tied around 
the neck: one family had a green bow and the other had a blue blow. The two bear-mothers were 
approximately 40 cm high, while the four cubs were 25 cm high. All the bears were hidden inside a 
black rigid bag. 
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Figure 1 a. The two teddy-bear families. 
Figure 1 b. The experimental setting: the two teddy-bear families and the two different distributions of biscuits. Ex = 
Experimenter, I = Infant, Ed = Educator. 
 
The experimenter started to present the first family, taking one big bear and saying: “Let’s 
play, I introduce you to bear-mother Lisa (the experimenter takes one big bear and puts it down in 
front of her), and to her 2 cubs: Carlo (the experimenter takes two small bears from the bag, and 
shows one of the two cubs and puts it in front of the bear-mother on her right) and Marco (the 
experimenter showed the other cub and puts it in front of the bear-mother on her left)”. Behind the 
back of each bear-mother, two biscuits were hidden in a pocket. The experimenter took the two 
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biscuits and showed one by one to the bear-mother Lisa, she mimicked an equal distribution of the 
biscuits saying: “Bear-mother Lisa gives one cookie to Carlo and another to Marco”. Then the 
experimenter took the second big bear form the bag and, acting a similar presentation of the first 
family, she said: “There is also another bear family: Bear-mother Maria with her cubs, Antonio and 
Alessio”. The experimenter took the two biscuits from the back of Maria and mimicked an unequal 
distribution of the biscuits saying: “Bear-mother Maria gives two biscuits to Antonio and nothing to 
Alessio”. Finally, the experimenter, taking the two bear-mothers and putting them in front of the 
baby (at 50-60 cm), asked the baby “Now, let’s play together! Pick the good bear-mother”. Once 
the baby took one bear-mother or pointed one, the experimenter thanked him/her and let the child 
play a bit with the bears. The educators were instructed before the study not to talk to the infants or 
point to the bears, if infants were reluctant to choose, a second experimenter behind the educator 
prompted the educator with a slight touch of the shoulder to help the infant get up to go towards the 
bears. 
The following were counterbalanced across infants: order and side of distribution (equal vs. 
unequal), blue or green bowtie for the bear families. The entire session lasted approximately 5 
minutes. 
5.2.1.3 Infants’ coding responses  
After the testing phase, the experimenter wrote on a sheet of paper infants’ responses and later 
she saw the recordings for any doubt. Furthermore, the experimenter coded infants’ response time, 
i.e. the time it took for the infants to reach or to point to the bear from the experimenter’s request to 
take the good bear. An independent coder recoded all infants’ responses and agreed with the 
original experimenter on 100% of trials. 
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5.2.2 Results and Discussion 
Infants’ responses to the request of pick up “the good bear-mother” are represented in Figure 
2 (a). Seventeen infants (out of 23) selected preferentially the unfair mother (p = .03, two-choice 
binomial test, two-tailed). The response time to choose a bear, either by pointing or grasping, was 
47.50 sec (SD = 49.62) for infants who chose the fair bear-mother, and 24.94 sec (SD = 18.46) for 
infants who chose the unfair bear-mother. No significant difference emerged between the two 
response times (z = -.84, p = .40). 
Infants’ moral competence in the domain of fairness seems not to be mapped at 20 months 
onto an appropriate lexical item. When infants were explicitly asked to pick up the good bear-
mother, they were oriented towards the unfair one. The result of the Experiment 1 is contrary of our 
initial hypotheses and it seems to highlight an interaction problem between the sense of fairness and 
the lexical knowledge of the word 'good'. 
Figure 2. For the domain of fairness: (a) twenty-month-old infants’ responses after the Experimenter asked them to 
pick the good bear-mother between a fair and an unfair distributors (Experiment 1); (b) responses of another group of 
infants after the Experimenter asked them to pick one of the bear-mothers (Experiment 2). For the domain of harm: (c) 
infants’ responses after the Experimenter asked them to pick the good one between a helping and a hindering distributor 
(Experiment 3).  
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5.3 Experiment 2 
To exclude possible problems in the procedure of the Experiment 1, we run Experiment 2, as 
a control study, where the task was to pick one of the distributors not specifying the characteristic 
concerning the goodness of the agent. In this second Experiment, the hypothesis is that infants are 
selectively oriented towards the fair distributor, as was previously found (e.g., Geraci & Surian, 
2011; Meristo & Surian, 2013; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011; Sloane et al., 2012; Sommerville, et 
al., 2013).  
5.3.1 Method 
5.3.1.1 Participants 
A group of 23 healthy full-term infants of 20 months of age (12 females, Mage = 20 months, 
14 days, age range: 18 months, 2 days to 25 months, 0 days) were recruited at local public and 
private nurseries of Trento, Italy. Fifteen additional infants were excluded from the study due to 
their refusal to participate (n = 8), interference of the educator (n = 4), procedural error (n = 3). The 
recruitment method was the same of the Experiment 1. 
5.3.1.2 Stimuli and procedure 
The stimuli and the procedure were similar to those followed in Experiment 1. The main 
difference concerned the final task requested to the infants. In this case, at the end of the 
presentation of the bear families, the experimenter asked the infants: “Pick one bear-mother”. 
5.3.1.3 Infants’ coding responses 
The coding was the same followed in Experiment 1. The independent coder agreed with the 
original experimenter on 100% of trials. 
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5.3.2 Results and Discussion 
Infants’ responses to the request of pick up “one of the bear-mothers” are represented in 
Figure 2(b). Sixteen infants (out of 22) preferred the fair mother who equally divided resources 
between her cubs (p = .052, two-choice binomial test, two-tailed).  
The response time to choose a bear, either by pointing or grasping, was 24.76 sec (SD = 
27.41) for infants who chose the fair bear-mother, and 31.67 sec (SD = 26.42) for infants who chose 
the unfair bear-mother. No significant difference emerged between the both response time (z = -.60, 
p = .55).  
The results of this experiment, on infants’ preference for the fair agent, confirmed the 
presence of an emerging sense of fairness at 20 months of age. This reassures that the unexpected 
result of the Experiment 1 is really linked to the introduction of the word 'good' and not to 
procedural problem. 
5.4 Experiment 3 
Here, we tested whether infants correctly map the word 'good' in the domain of harm. 
Previous research showed that already in the first year of life infants prefer agents that help rather 
than hinder others (e.g., Dunfield & Kuhlmieier, 2010; Hamlin, et al., 2007; Hamlin, et al., 2011; 
Kuhlmeier, et al., 2003).  
If infants’ moral competence on this domain is mapped at this age onto an appropriate lexical 
item, we hypothesize that infants are selectively oriented towards the helper agent rather than the 
hinderer agent. In this case, we did not run a control study because already Hamlin et al. (2007) 
showed a robust preference in 10- month-old infants to choose the helper using a similar procedure 
of the present study. Therefore, we directly run Experiment 3 with the task of picking up the good 
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characters in a sample of infants with a similar age of Experiments 1 and 2.  
5.4.1 Method 
5.4.1.1 Participants 
A group of 26 healthy full-term 20-month-olds (14 females, Mage = 20 months, 81 days, age 
range: 17 months, 6 days to 25 months, 10 days) were recruited at local public and private nurseries 
of Trento, Italy. Twelve additional infants were excluded from the study due to their refusal to 
participate (n = 8), interference of the educator (n = 3), procedural error (n = 1). The recruitment 
method was the same of Experiment 1. 
5.4.1.2 Stimuli and procedure 
Infants were presented with four familiarization events, followed by a test trial as the study of 
Hamlin et al. (2007). In the familiarization events, two helping and two hindering events were 
shown. The familiarization events started by showing a climber (a red ball) that jiggled up and 
down at the bottom of a hill and then it attempted twice to climb a hill, and each time it fell back to 
the bottom. On the third attempt, in the helping events, the climber was pushed up the hill by the 
helper, whereas in the hindering events, the climber was pushed down the hill by the hinderer. The 
helper entered the scene always from the lower right, and the hinderer from the upper left. The 
helper and the hinderer could be a blue square or a yellow triangle. Total event duration was 160 
sec (40 sec for each video). The order presentation of the helping and hindering events and the 
colored shapes (blue square vs. yellow triangle) were counterbalanced. 
At the end of the four familiarization events, in the test trial infants were presented with a 
white board where there were the helper shape and the hinderer shape (25 cm apart). The 
experimenter said to infants: “Pick up or touch the good one!” The side of presentation of the two 
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shapes was counterbalanced. 
5.4.1.3 Infants’ coding responses 
The coding was the same followed in Experiment 1. In this case, for the infants’ response 
time the experimenter coded the time it took for the infants to reach with the hand the choose a 
character from the experimenter’s request to pick up the good character. The independent coder 
agreed with the original experimenter on 100% of trials. 
5.4.2 Results and Discussion 
Infants’ responses to the request of pick up “the good one” are represented in Figure 2(c). 
Infants’ responses were equally distributed in the sample: 13 infants picked up the helper, and 13 
the hinderer. The response time to choose a character was 9.38 sec (SD = 21.54) for infants who 
chose the helper, and 13.85 sec (SD = 18.88) for infants who chose the hinderer. No significant 
difference emerged between the two response times (z = -1.28, p = .20). 
Infants’ moral competence in the domain of harm seems not to be mapped at 20 months onto 
an appropriate lexical item when explicitly asked to pick up the good one; they were not selectively 
oriented to any of them. An interaction problem between the sense of harm and the lexical 
knowledge of the word “good” emerged also in this domain.   
5.5 Experiment 4 
In Experiment 4, infants were tested for their knowledge of the word 'good' in the domain of 
food. We hypothesize that 20-month-old infants are able to associate the label 'good' to a food that 
they really like, considering that on one hand at this age infants usually have tried different kinds of 
food and they are able to express (verbally or behaviorally) their preferences, and on the other hand 
the caregivers and, adults in general, say often to them in eating contexts: “Is it good? Do you like 
  
105 
 
it?”. Therefore, it is plausible that at 20 months of age, infants correctly map the word 'good' in the 
domain of food. 
5.5.1 Method 
5.5.1.1 Participants 
A group of 23 healthy full-term 20-month-olds (13 females, Mage = 20 months, 28 days, age 
range: 17 months, 5 days to 25 months, 10 days) were recruited at local public and private nurseries 
of Trento, Italy. Nine additional infants were excluded from the study due to their refusal to 
participate. The recruitment method was the same of Experiment 1. 
5.5.1.2 Stimuli and procedure 
Infants were presented with a choice test with five pairs of food cards. In the first pair, there 
was a biscuit in one card and broccoli in the other; in the second pair; an ice cream and a fennel, in 
the third; candies and cabbage, in the fourth; biscuits and vegetables, and in the last; pizza and 
vegetables (see Figure 3). The cards were colored and represented real images of food. Their 
dimensions were 15 cm width X 21 cm high. The side of presentation of the two cards was 
counterbalanced. The experimenter asked to infants to pick up or touch “the good one”.  
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Figure 3. The five pairs of food cards. 
5.5.1.3 Infants’ coding responses 
The coding was the same followed in Experiment 1. The independent coder agreed with the 
original experimenter on 100% of trials. 
5.5.2 Results and Discussion 
For the first two pairs of cards and for the last pair, infants preferred: biscuit, ice cream and 
pizza rather than broccoli, fennel and vegetables (for all pairs p < .01, two-choice binomial test, 
two-tailed). Also regarding the pair of cards with biscuits and vegetables, infants’ preference 
approached significance for biscuits (p = .052, two-choice binomial test, two-tailed). Instead, for the 
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pair of cards with cabbage and candies, infants did not show any preference. A possible explanation 
(suggested by educators) is that usually at this age candies are forbidden, parents say to children 
that candies are bad, so very few infants could think that candies are a good food.  
The mean frequencies of infants’ responses for the food typically liked and the food typically 
disliked are represented in Figure 4. Most infants selected the items that are typically liked by 
young children rather than the food typically disliked, t(8) = 4.87, p = .001. All together, these 
results suggest that at 20 months of age, the term 'good' is correctly mapped for qualities in the 
domain of food. 
Figure 4. The mean frequency of infants who selected the items typically liked by young children (biscuit, ice cream, 
candies, biscuits, pizza) and of infants who selected the items typically disliked by young children (broccoli, fennel, 
cabbage). No choice indicates the mean frequency of infants who did not select any item.  
 
5.6 Experiment 5 
Considering that the results of the first four Experiments lead to think that at 20 months of 
age, the term 'good' is correctly mapped for qualities in the domain of food, but not yet in the core 
moral domains of fairness and harm, another experiment was run with older infants (30 months of 
age). In Experiment 5, the word 'good' was tested in the domain of fairness in infants of two years 
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and a half, in a similar way as in Experiment 1 with fair and unfair distributors. The hypothesis is 
that infants are not selectively oriented to neither of the two agents if their moral competence is not 
yet mapped onto an appropriate lexical item, or that they are selectively oriented towards the fair 
distributor if their moral competence is mapped onto an appropriate lexical item at this age. 
5.6.1 Method 
5.6.1.1 Participants 
A group of 42 healthy full-term infants of two years and half (24 females, Mage = 30 months, 
24 days, age range: 26 months, 25 days to 34 months, 3 days) were recruited at local public and 
private nurseries of Trento, Italy. Ten additional infants were excluded from the study due to their 
refusal to participate (n = 8), interference of the educator (n = 2). The recruitment method was the 
same of Experiment 1. 
5.6.1.2 Stimuli and procedure 
The stimuli and the procedure were similar to those followed in Experiment 1.  
5.6.1.3 Infants’ coding responses 
The coding was the same followed in Experiment 1. The independent coder agreed with the 
original experimenter on 100% of trials. 
 
 
 
 
  
109 
 
5.6.2 Results and Discussion 
Infants’ responses to the request of pick up “the good bear-mother” are represented in Figure 
5(a). Eighteen infants (out of 42) selected preferentially the unfair mother (p = .441, two-choice 
binomial test, two-tailed). The response time to choose a bear, either by pointing or grasping, was 
25.56 sec (SD = 16.51) for infants who chose the fair bear-mother, and 34.87 sec (SD = 43.33) for 
infants who chose the unfair bear-mother. No significant difference emerged between the two 
response times (z = -.70, p = .484). 
Figure 5. For the domain of fairness: (a) thirty-month-old infants’ responses after the Experimenter asked them to pick 
the good bear-mother between a fair and an unfair distributor (Experiment 5). For the domain of harm: (b) infants’ 
responses after the Experimenter asked them to pick the good one between a helping and a hindering distributor 
(Experiment 6).  
Infants’ moral competence in the domain of fairness seems not to be mapped at 30 months 
onto an appropriate lexical item. When infants were explicitly asked to pick up the good bear-
mother, they were not selectively oriented towards the fair or unfair agents.  
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5.7 Experiment 6 
In this Experiment, the word 'good' was tested in the domain of harm in infants of two years 
and a half, in a similar way as in Experiment 3 with helping and hindering agents. The hypothesis is 
that infants are not selectively oriented to neither of the two agents if their moral competence is not 
yet mapped onto an appropriate lexical item, or that they are selectively oriented towards the helper 
if their moral competence is mapped onto an appropriate lexical item at this age. 
5.7.1 Method 
5.7.1.1 Participants 
A group of 39 healthy full-term infants of two years and a half (23 females, Mage = 31 months, 
1 day, age range: 26 months, 25 days to 33 months, 25 days) were recruited at local public and 
private nurseries of Trento, Italy. Eight additional infants were excluded from the study due to their 
refusal to participate (n = 4), interference of the educator (n = 2), procedural error (n = 2). The 
recruitment method was the same of Experiment 1. 
5.7.1.2 Stimuli and procedure 
The stimuli and the procedure were similar to those followed in Experiment 3.  
5.7.1.3 Infants’ coding responses 
The coding was the same followed in Experiment 3. The independent coder agreed with the 
original experimenter on 100% of trials. 
5.7.2 Results and Discussion 
Infants’ responses to the request of pick up “the good character” are represented in Figure 
5(b). Twenty-seven infants (out of 39) picked up the helper rather than the hinderer and the 
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difference in this choice test was significant (p = .024, two-choice binomial test, two-tailed). The 
response time to choose a character was 6.37 sec (SD = 6.66) for infants who chose the helper, and 
6.33 sec (SD = 6.01) for infants who chose the hinderer. No significant difference emerged between 
the two response times (z = -.05, p = .964). 
Infants’ moral competence in the domain of harm seems to be mapped at 30 months onto an 
appropriate lexical item. When infants were explicitly asked to pick up the good one, they were 
selectively oriented towards the helping agent.  
5.8 General Discussion 
Overall, the results of the present study suggest that at 20 months of age, the term 'good' is 
correctly mapped for qualities in the domain of food, but not yet in the core moral domains of 
fairness and harm. Instead, at 30 months of age, the term 'good' is correctly mapped for qualities in 
the domain of harm, but not yet in the core domain of fairness. 
Regarding the fairness domain, in the Experiment 1, infants were explicitly asked to pick up 
the good bear-mother and they were oriented towards the unfair one rather than the fair. On the 
other hand, when infants were asked to pick up one of the bear-mothers (Experiment 2), they were 
oriented towards the fair one. This last result is in line with the findings of Geraci and Surian (2011) 
who showed with a manual choice test, a significant tendency at 16 months to pick up a fair puppet 
distributor rather than an unfair distributor. The curious thing in our findings is that when we added 
the term 'good' in the requests to pick up a bear, the results of the 20-month-olds are completely 
inverted.  
A first consideration we could advance is that at 20 months, the term 'good' seems not to be 
associated with fairness qualities in the distributive behavior of the puppets. When we considered 
an older group of infants (Experiment 5), we found that at two years and a half infants were no 
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more oriented towards the unfair bear as at 20 months, they simply were not selectively oriented to 
any of them. 
The second consideration is that probably, the term 'good', in particular at 20 months of age, is 
associated with something else that we have to deepen in future studies. For example, we could 
hypothesize that the word 'good' could activate in infants the link with food, and this activation 
could focalize their attention on the little bear who received two biscuits and, consequently, they 
oriented preferentially towards the unfair mother independently of the distributors’ fairness. 
Increasing with age, more infants start to lose this strong and univocal link between 'good' and food, 
and they start to link 'good' also to other contexts (i.e., fairness). In sum, these first results 
demonstrated that there is an emerging sense of fairness at 20 months, at this age infants’ moral 
competence in the domain of fairness does not seem to be mapped onto an appropriate lexical item 
yet, though it starts to be mapped at 30 months in some infants, but not in the majority.  
In the other hand, the harm domain, in Experiment 3, infants at 20 months of age were 
explicitly asked to pick up the good one between a helper and a hinderer, and they were not 
selectively oriented to any of them. Instead, at 30 months of age (Experiment 6), infants were 
selectively oriented to the helper. Previous literature showed a robust preference in 10-month-old 
infants to choose the helper using a similar procedure but asking to infants only to pick up one 
(Hamlin et al., 2007). 
In our case, it is extremely interesting that there are no significant results at 20 months, 
because contrarily to Experiment 1, here there is no food in the presented scenarios. The term 'good' 
seems to be associated with nothing, because children pick up by chance. 
We might also assume that in the domain of harm, 20-month-old infants’ moral competence 
does not seem to be mapped onto an appropriate lexical item, until they reach about 30 months of 
age when infants are able to link the word 'good' also to the harm contexts, as we found in 
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Experiment 6.  
Finally, in Experiment 4, we tested the word 'good' in the domain of food. As predicted, we 
found that the term 'good' is correctly mapped for qualities in the domain of food in 20-month-old 
infants. 
Considering that preverbal infants, even younger of our participants, have shown to possess 
the ability to assign positive values to fair and helping actions (e.g. Hamlin, et al., 2011; Meristo & 
Surian, 2013), it seems that the ability to map the underlying representations to the word 'good' may 
be a relatively a late achievement. Certainly, the word 'good' is correctly associated at 20 months 
only with the domain of food. Not only correctly, but also strongly associated so much that we 
could hypothesize that it interferes with the other domains in the presence of food, as revealed in 
Experiment 1. At 30 months, this word is correctly associated with the domain of harm, and it starts 
in some infants to be associated also with the domain of fairness.  
In conclusion, that the meaning of 'good' at 20 months operates only in the food domain, as an 
adjective, and at 30 months operates also in the domain of harm. Therefore, with the present 
research we highlighted an asynchrony across moral development, in particular for the domains that 
involve the sense of fairness and harm, and the linguistic domain. There is an emerging sense of 
fairness and harm in 20-month-olds, but these concepts are not yet correctly mapped at a linguistic 
level, until 30 months for the harm domain and later for the fairness domain. 
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PRELIMINARY REPORT 
Do children consider merit? A cross-cultural study based on Colombian and 
Italian distributive actions 
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6.1 Introduction 
Justice amounts to distributing resources fairly in a variety of situations. Implementing 
justice to the world usually includes taking into account many different parameters, for this reason, 
justice is based on principles such as equity, equality and need (Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991). The 
equity-based justice requires that resources are allocated according to the quantity or quality of 
goods and services produced by an individual’s: productivity, commitment and competence. The 
need-based justice requires that resources are allocated according to the needs of people eg. poverty 
and disadvantage. And, the equality-based justice (fairness) implies that everyone should receive a 
resource evenly. According to Damon (1977, as described in Kanngiesser & Warneken, 2012), 
children are assumed to go through three developmental stages: infants tend to be selfish (distribute 
awards according to their own interest), preschoolers tend to be egalitarian (equal distributions, 
regardless of an individual’s contributions) and older children start to consider an individual’s 
contribution (merit or equity). Moreover, related literature explains how merit-based behaviors 
emerges later in development (Almas, Cappelen, Sørensen, Tungodden, 2010; Enright & 
Sutterfield, 1980; Piaget, 1932; Leventhal, Popp, Sawyer, 1973; Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991), 
using however methods that might be very challenging for young children, potentially hiding their 
early competence.  
In the last decade, developmental studies asking children to distribute resources to third 
parties have consistently demonstrated that the concern for fairness and merit emerges early in 
development. Infants expect resources to be distributed equally (Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011; 
Sloane, Baillargeon, Premack & 2012; Sommerville, Schmidt, Yun & Burns, 2013), and when 
having to choose between a puppet who performed an equal distribution and another puppet who 
did not, they demonstrate a clear preference for the egalitarian puppet (Geraci & Surian, 2011). 3-
year-olds when presented with a simple story (set of vignettes), reasoned that a character that 
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finished a task was most likely to receive more cookies than a character that became bored and 
stopped early, although this ability may be hidden by a preference of equality (Baumard et al., 
2012). In a cross-cultural study based on the same procedure using  5-year-old Turcana children, 
Liénard, Chevallier, Mascaro, Kiura, Baumard (2013) revealed that these children present the same 
understanding of merit as the western children.  
Similarly, other studies with 3-year-olds reveal that infants share mostly equally after they 
take into account merit when distributing resources towards an individual that had contributed more 
to a task but had received less compensation (Hamann, Bender & Tomasello, 2014), and when 
sharing or giving more resources to a partner that had contributed more to a task (Kanngiesser & 
Warneken, 2012). Also, in situations when they choose not to be fair, infants seem to understand 
that they should have been fair (Smith, Blake & Harris, 2013). Finally, Rochat, Dias, Liping, 
Broesch, Passos-Ferreira, Winning and Berg (2009) suggest that the sense of fairness, deferred 
gratification and reciprocity principles are all important at the core of the human enculturation 
process, and that these form the roots of the human sense of equity. For this reason, it would be 
important to see how this sense develops in children growing up in very different sociological, 
economical and cultural environments. 
Along these lines of previous studies, it thus remains an open question whether children of 
different social-economic status/levels (SES) and cultural environments (mainly all research is 
based on western populations) will act in accordance with this proficiency when distributing 
resources in third-person situations.  
Research on a Colombian population carried out by Posada and Wainryb (2008) of children 
exposed to violence in a “displaced environment”, showed that these ‘displaced children’ (6-9-year-
olds and 13-16 year olds) are well aware of the moral principles on stealing, and hurting others, and 
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how these behaviors are morally wrong. Although, when asking older participants (adolescents) if 
by taking revenge on a person who ‘had hurt his family and they saw this person in the street, if it 
was ok to hurt them?’, generally, participants replied that it was not morally wrong to hurt a person 
in these circumstances, but rather because those people would come back and punish whoever 
engaged on such actions. These children have been uprooted as a consequence of armed conflict 
and human rights violations, seeking safety abroad or within their own borders. To evaluate the role 
of socioeconomic status and exposure to violence on concepts of harm, Ardila-Rey, Killen, and 
Brenick (2009) carried out a study of both displaced (displaced by war and living in shantytowns) 
and middle-income (living in a relatively peaceful town) children in Colombia. They found 
significant differences in 6- to 12-year-olds’ moral judgments based on levels of exposure to 
violence and living conditions. All children viewed acts of harm (hitting) and unfair distribution of 
toys (not sharing) as wrong using moral reasons. However, the displaced children judged it more 
legitimate to hit in reaction to provocation or retaliation than nondisplaced children who had 
experienced minimal exposure to violence. All children viewed post-conflict reconciliation between 
the transgressor and recipient as feasible and worthwhile. 
Half of the world’s displaced people are children. Currently, it is estimated that there are 10 
million children refugees worldwide; an additional 13 million children are internally displaced 
within their own countries. In Colombia alone, the number of displaced Colombian children surged 
to 17, 573 in 2012, children that have been forcibly displaced from their homes and towns during 
the past 15 years (Stringer, 2013). These numbers also carry the disturbing implication that more 
and more of the world’s children are being sucked into a bleak moral vacuum or a psychological 
space devoid of basic human rights and values. How might children’s moral development be altered 
by the violence, lawlessness, and deprivation to which they are exposed? Or, is it simply a universal 
phenomenon that is independent from social situations.    
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In the present study, we examined if children of two very different cultural environments are 
able to take merit into account, studying 3, 4 and 5-6 year old children. We have taken into account 
ideas extracted from Baumard et al. (2012), but unlike them, we showed children a scenario instead 
of telling a story to make it more dynamic or active when we interpreted the scenes, this makes it 
also more entertaining for children at this age. Children were presented with two characters, a 
hardworking bear and lazy working bear that were asked by an experimenter to play a game of 
building up a house. One starts working and eventually after declaring that it is hard work finishes 
the game; afterwards the other bear starts working and stops do to exhaustion without finishing the 
game. Lastly, children were asked to distribute three biscuits.  
We evaluated children’s biscuit distributions. The task involved two distribution phases, an 
initial and final phase. The initial phase allowed children to distribute any amount of biscuits to 
their liking and the final phase, however, children are asked to distribute any remaining biscuit. 
Taking into account previous studies described above, children sometimes favor equality when 
given the chance, and that they have an underlying ability to understand that a greater contributor 
has the right to more than a lesser contributor. We included 3, 4 and 5-6 year old children to our 
study and hypothesized that by 5-6-year-olds would have less problem reasoning to which character 
the final biscuit is distributed as opposed to the younger groups, and we assumed that they would 
choose the hardworking bear. Moreover, we wanted to observe if there is a difference in a 
determined context, thus we observed Italian and Colombian children. The Colombian children, 
from a ‘displaced population’. Children that have dealt with poverty and trauma from the 
displacement experience, single parents, lack of employment, poor hygiene and physical abuse. 
And, the Italian children from Trento, which are exposed to a completely different western 
environment. 
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6.2 Experiment 1 
Preschoolers are presented with a typical situation of distributive justice involving varying 
levels of contribution. With a similar procedure as Baumard, Mascaro and Chevallier (2012) 
Children are asked to distribute 3 biscuits at the end of the task. We predicted like Baumard et al. 
(2012) that some children would spontaneously favor equality but that beyond this egalitarian 
response children would still think that the bigger contributor has a right to slightly more than the 
lesser contributor. 
6.2.1 Method 
6.2.1.1 Participants  
Ninety-eight Italian born preschoolers were recruited. Children were divided by three 
age groups: nineteen 3-year-olds (10 females; mean age = 43 months and 5 days; SD = 2.5; 
range = 39 - 47 months). 3 children were excluded for not responding to the task. twenty-six 4 
year-olds (12 females; mean age = 53 months and 1 day; SD =8.8; range = 48 – 59 months). 1 
child was excluded for not responding to the task. Fifty-three 5-6-year-olds (22 females; mean 
age = 66 months and 2 days; SD = 5.1; range = 60 - 76 months). Recruitment took place in two 
preschools in Trento (Northern Italy), serving middle class communities. The local coordinator 
of preschools contacted the schools and sent them the consent forms and the information 
regarding the study to give out to all parents.  
6.2.1.2 Materials and Procedure 
The University of Trento ethics committee approved the method. Participants were tested 
individually in a quiet room, close to their classrooms. The experimenters first familiarized the child 
with two identical large stuffed bears (characters or agents), saying “see, this is Antonio, and this is 
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Roberto. They play together. Can you show me which is Antonio and which is Roberto? Good! 
Bravo!” Bear names matched the gender of the child, they differed by having different colored 
bowties (green and blue; counterbalanced between subjects). The experimenter then assured the 
child remembered the names of each bear. After this important step the ‘building game’ is 
introduced. While sitting on the floor with the child, the experimenter says: “let’s all play a game, 
but let’s start with you Antonio (grabbing one of the bears), I would like to see a house”, while 
sitting about 30 cm away from the box, one of the bears has to reach out and grab the basket where 
the blocks are and starts building a house, the bear showing signs of difficulty building it says “this 
is hard work”, but continues going and after a while builds up an identifiable house, finally saying 
with satisfaction: “oh how nice, I finished”. The experimenter then says: “ok, what about you 
Roberto?” and picks up the other bear which instantly grabs his blocks from the basket and starts 
building a house as well, next to the other bear. After a while (about 1 minute), he starts to show 
signs of boredom by sighing and finally utters: “I don’t want to play anymore, I’m tired” and does 
not finish the game. Thus, there was a ‘hard-working bear’ (the character that completed the task) 
and a ‘lazy-working bear’ (the character that gave up). The child sat on the floor in front both bears 
and two trays containing identical sets of Duplo LEGO blocks. 
 After this final action, on the initial distribution phase the experimenter says, “ok then, now 
I have three biscuits” and passes them to the child, all in a horizontal way on a plate (Fig. 1), and 
tells him to: “who would you give a biscuit to? Antonio or Roberto?” (names are counterbalanced 
between subjects) after 15 seconds the child has to have completed this task, if not the experimenter 
encourages him to do it again. On the final distribution phase, after the child has done their first 
distribution and there are still some biscuits left, the experimenter asks him: “Oh look! There are 
still some left, who would you give it to? Antonio or Roberto?” After the child distributes the final 
biscuits, the experimenter asked “Why did you give it to …?” Justifications mentioning the 
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characters’ respective levels of contribution were considered correct (e.g., “because Antonio 
finished the house” or similar positive responses) other justifications (e.g., “because he looked 
nicer”) or absence of justification (e.g., “I don’t know”, “because yes” or silence) were coded as 
incorrect (bears, names of bears, position of the bears and sides of the hard-working and lazy-
working bears will all be counterbalanced). A second coder classified all justifications and there 
was an agreement of 100% between both coders in experiment 1 and 2. 
 
Figure 1. Image of the initial distribution phase, showing both the hard-working bear with his completed house and the 
lazy working bear with his uncompleted house. The experimenter is displaying the act of handing the plate with biscuits 
to the child. 
 
6.2.2 Results 
We took three variables into account: (a) who was given a biscuit first, if the hard worker or 
the lazy worker (b) children’s initial distribution phase, i.e. if given an equal distribution, and(c) 
children’s final distribution phase, i.e. which is given the final biscuit. 
53 out of 98 children gave the first cookie to the hardworking bear, which reveals no 
significant difference,  p = .48, two-choice binomial, OR = 1.18 (8 out of 19 3-year-olds,  p = .65, 
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two choice binomial, OR = .73. 14 out of 26 4-year-olds, p = .85, two-choice binomial, OR = 1.15. 
30 out of 51 5-6-year-olds,  p = .26, two-choice binomial, OR = 1.43). 
In children‘s initial distribution, 11 out of 98 children gave one biscuit to each bear, p < 
.001, nine-choice binomial, OR = .13  (3 out of 19 3-year-olds, p <.01, nine choice binomial, OR = 
.19. 2 out of 28 4-year-olds, p < .001, nine choice binomial, OR = .08. 6 out of 51 5-6-year-olds, p 
< .001, nine-choice binomial, OR = .13). These results show that children showed no significant 
preference towards an egalitarian distribution in the initial distribution phase (see Fig. 2).  
Considering the other 87 children who did not chose an egalitarian distribution, 49 gave one biscuit 
to the hardworking bear, p = .28, two choice binomial, OR = 1.29 (7 out of 16 3-year-olds, p = .8, 
two choice binomial, OR = .78. 14 out of 26 4-year-olds, p = .85, two choice binomial, OR = 1.17. 
28 out of 45 5-6-year-olds, p = .14, two-choice binomial, OR = 1.75). Moreover, of these 87 
children 12 children gave all biscuits to one of the bears in the initial distribution phase. 9 out of 12 
gave all the biscuits to the hardworking bear, p = .15, two choice binomial, OR = 3. With no 
difference between age groups, χ²(4) = 2.56, p = .64. There was no difference between the mean age 
of the 11 egalitarian children (M = 58.15, SD = 10.17) and the mean age of the 49 children (M = 
60.25, SD = 10.53) favoring the hardworking bear, t(89) = .4, p = .69.  
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Children’s initial distribution: 
Figure 2. Pattern of the initial distribution in 3, 4- and 5-6-year-olds. Note: HW = hardworking bear, L = lazy working 
bear.  
 
In the final distribution, the hardworking bear was favored by 33 children out of 63 p = .9, 
two-choice binomial, OR = 1.06, showing no significant difference, even when considering all age 
groups separately (7 out of 14 3-year-olds, p = 1.0, two-choice binomial, OR = 1. 8 out of 18 4-
year-olds, p = .81, two-choice binomial, OR = 8.27. 18 out of 32 5-6-year-olds, p = .6, two-choice 
binomial, OR = 1.27). Finally, when considering both the initial distribution when given only one 
biscuit to a bear and the first response in the final distribution phase, children’s response was 
mainly egalitarian in all age groups: 61 out of 72 children, p < .001, two choice binomial, OR = 
5.55.  
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We also analyzed children‘s justifications and found that a minority of children provided 
correct justifications (22 children out of 98, 1 out of 19 among 3-year olds, 3 out of 26 among 4-
year olds and 18 out of 53 among 5-6-year olds). There was a significant increase in children‘s 
capacity to justify their judgments (p = .01, Fisher‘s test). Note that older children have also the 
capacity of giving more elaborate and creative justifications like: “because this house was much 
bigger”, “because I gave one to Antonio and I had other two biscuits to give out” and “because he 
finished the house without stopping”.  
6.3 Experiment 2 
This experiment took place in Cali, Colombia. We used the same structure as in experiment 
1, but this time we recruited children from a completely different SES background and culture. We 
predicted that children from a developing country would perform in a similar way than the western 
European children showing that children’s social development is a universal rule, and proving once 
more that, despite their contextual differences, children have an egalitarian tendency with a slight 
preference towards the greater contributor.     
6.3.1 Method 
6.3.1.1 Participants  
One-hundred and seven Colombian born children were tested. Twenty-eight 3-year-olds (14 
females; mean age = 44 months and 3 days; SD = 2.0; range = 38 - 47 months). 4 children were 
excluded for not responding to the task. Forty-one 4-year-olds (22 females; mean age = 52 months 7 
days; SD = 7.2; range = 48 – 58 months) and thirty-eight 5-6 year olds (21 females; mean age = 5 
years 68 months 1 day; SD = 12.1; range = 61 - 73 months) all from the same SES background have 
been studied. We excluded children that have been diagnosed with cognitive disorders that could in 
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any way interfere with the outcome of this study. Informed consents, in written form, were given 
out to parents of all children who participated in this study. 
6.3.1.2 Materials and Procedure 
The University of Valle Ethics Committee on the Use of Human Subjects in Research have 
approved the ethics of this study. Participants were tested individually in a quiet room, close to their 
classrooms. The materials and procedure were identical to those used in Experiment 1. 
6.3.2 Results 
We used the same three variables used previously: (a) who was given a biscuit first, if the 
hard worker or the lazy worker (b) children’s initial distribution phase, i.e. if given an equal 
distribution, and(c) children’s final distribution phase, i.e. which is given the final biscuit. 
60 out of 107 children gave the first biscuit to the hardworking bear, which reveals no 
significant difference,  p = .25, two-choice binomial, OR = 1.28 (20 out of 28 3-year-olds, p < .05, 
two choice binomial, OR = 2.5. 21 out of 41 4-year-olds, p = 1.0, two-choice binomial, OR = 1.05, 
and 19 out of 38 5-6-year-olds, p = 1.0, two-choice binomial, OR = 1). 
Taking into account children‘s initial distribution, 48 out of 107 children gave one biscuit to 
each bear, p = .34, nine-choice binomial, OR = .81 (13 out of 28 3-year-olds, p = .85, two choice 
binomial, OR = .87. 18 out of 41 4-year-olds, p = .53, two choice binomial, OR = .78. 17 out of 38 
5-6-year-olds,  p = .63, two-choice binomial, OR = .82), revealing no significant inclination towards 
an egalitarian distribution to this point (see Fig. 3).  From the 59 remaining children that did not 
show an egalitarian distribution, 40 chose the hardworking bear, which differs from chance,  p < 
.01, two-choice binomial, OR = 2.11 (13 out of 15 3-year-olds, p < .01, two choice binomial, OR = 
6.5. 14 out of 23 4-year-olds, p = .41, two choice binomial, OR = 1.6. 13 out of 21 5-6-year-olds,  p 
  
129 
 
= .38, two-choice binomial, OR = 1.63).  With no difference between age groups, χ²(4) = 3.27, p = 
.51. There was no difference between the mean age of the 48 egalitarian children (M = 55.69, SD = 
9.74)  and the mean age of the 40 children (M = 54.2, SD = 10.82) favoring the hardworking bear, 
t(77) = .58, p = .57. 
Children’s initial distribution: 
Figure 3. Pattern of the initial distribution in 3, 4- and 5-6-year-olds. Note: HW = hardworking bear, L = lazy working 
bear.  
In the final distribution, the hardworking contributor was favored by 41 children out of 77 p 
= .65, two-choice binomial, OR = 1.14, showing no significant difference (9 out of 21 3-year-olds, p 
= .66, two-choice binomial, OR = .75. 17 out of 29 4-year-olds, p = .46, two-choice binomial, OR = 
1.42. 15 out of 27 5-6-year-olds, p = .7, two-choice binomial, OR = 1.25).  
Finally, when considering both the initial distribution when given only one biscuit to a bear 
and the first response in the final distribution phase, we found no significant difference in all age 
  
130 
 
groups for an egalitarian distribution: 40 out of 77 children, p = .82, two choice binomial, OR = 
1.08.  
Colombian children‘s justifications were also analyzed showing again a minority of children 
providing correct justifications (23 children out of 107, 1 out of 28 among 3-year olds, 5 out of 41 
among 4-year olds and 17 out of 38 among 5-6-year olds). Again, there was a significant increase in 
children‘s capacity to justify their judgments with age (p = .001, Fisher‘s test). Note that children 
under four instead of not giving a justification, as many Italian children did, mainly responded 
“because yes”. 
We made a final analysis comparing both Italian and Colombian children, to see if age and 
country affected the percentage of children that selected an egalitarian distribution. We found that 
there was no significant difference in both samples, χ²(2) = 3.70, p = .16. 
6.4 Discussion 
We studied if children of two different cultural environments (Italian and Colombian) were 
able to consider merit when distributing goods to an individual that has contributed more to a task, 
and if, by having the opportunity to be egalitarian, they were able to share one biscuit with each 
recipient. Using a similar experimental procedure (ours with bears and acted out instead of 
vignettes) as Baumard, Mascaro, Chevallier (2012). These authors revealed that 3-year-olds are able 
to consider merit when prompted to do so, although, when given the opportunity to willingly 
distribute goods, they prefer to distribute in an equitable way. They provided evidence of an early 
development of equity and that young children understand that the greater contributor has more 
rights than the lesser contributor.  
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Did we prove that children as young as three of two very different societies are able to 
consider merit or also have an egalitarian choice when given the chance? We did not. Not only did 
we not find it in 3-year-olds, we also did not find it in the older children in both societies, Italy and 
Colombia. The initial distribution phase, however, revealed cross-cultural differences in children’s 
spontaneous preferences: Colombian children had a stronger tendency (but not significant) to favor 
an egalitarian distribution but this initial egalitarian preference was less frequent among Italian 
children. This result is quite surprising since we expected that at least the Italian children (western 
children) should already engage in these behaviors (we will look into these issues later on). 
Furthermore, there was no consistent information for the final distribution phase in all age groups of 
both societies.  
Having some inconsistencies with previous works, described above, there can be some ways 
to interpret these. Mainly we can hypothesize that it was a procedural problem, since our acted out 
scenario may be too verbal and more distracting to the younger children. However, if this is the 
case, why did we still not find an egalitarian tendency when given the chance after the initial phase 
or also a notorious favoritism towards the bigger contributor in the older children? Again, it could 
be a procedural issue, even if we used the same concepts as Baumard et al. (2012), we did a 
different experimental procedure (building a house instead of baking cookies), and a different 
environmental scenario (acting out the scene instead of showing a set of vignettes).  
Other possibilities could be: that children did not confide with the experimenter or with the 
bears, suggesting that they might have had a bias based on their decision (Olson & Spelke, 2008), or 
since they were all tested in a preschool environment, this could lead to a self-presentational bias, 
such as whether their resource decision is known to other members of the group or not (Shaw, 
Montinari, Piovesan, Olson, Gino & Norton, 2014). Additionally, it could also be that children are 
bound to make more equitable decisions with a friend than with a non-friend peer or a stranger 
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(Moore, 2009; Paulus & Moore, 2013). All the previous possibilities of why our study was not 
consistent with studies of the same nature (Baumard, et al., 2012, Baumard, et al., 2013), might 
explain our results, but since it is also probable that they may have also encountered the same kind 
of concerns these interpretations are highly unlikely.  
Italy and Colombia are in very different socio-economical situations. Although our study did 
not test this factor directly, it is possible that socioeconomic status (SES) has an impact on 
children’s distributive preferences. As reported on Ardila-Rey, et al. (2009) study, revealing that 
there were significant differences in 6- to 12-year-olds’ moral judgments based on levels of 
exposure to violence and living conditions (in two different SES’s within the same culture). There 
has also been strong evidence that SES within the same culture has an impact on moral psychology 
(Nettle, Colléony & Cockerill, 2011). Therefore, for Future cross-cultural work it would be 
interesting to address these factors in order to gain a finer understanding of within and between 
cultures differences in children’s moral judgments. We could, using a replicated experimental 
procedure as Baumard, et al. (2012), test children of the same society (Colombian children) with 
two different SES’s (Ardila-Rey, et al., 2009), to see if we find a finer and more elaborated 
explanation to our findings.  
Finally, it is normal that in cross-cultural research, the size of each sample once children are 
split by age and culture is relatively small, this was not the case for our study since we had a rich 
sample for each age group in both societies, although we did have a difference in number in each 
age group of both societies. In any case, it does not make a difference since we did not get the 
results we were expecting even by having a rich sample.  
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PART THREE: GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
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Chapter 7 
7.1 General discussion and conclusion 
Is morality innate? I have tested this hypothesis in my research by using equal and unequal 
resource allocation tasks. We verified the development of the emerging sense of fairness by 
measuring looking times, anticipatory looks, and manual preference in 15- and 19-month-old 
infants, with movies with both animated characters and real life characters (see chapters 2 and 3). 
We revealed that infants are able to evaluate agents’ behavior and have an expectation towards an 
equitable resource distribution, and also preferred a fair distributor over an unfair distributor in the 
manual choice task. The most plausible interpretation for my results is that moral development 
involves some degree of innateness. My results, therefore, contribute to the growing body of 
evidence for moral nativism, some of which will be discussed next. More specifically, they are 
evidence for the innate tendency to recognize fairness and be concerned of whether or not others 
behave in a fair manner, in other words, the early emergence of justice.  
How can we explain the early emergence of the sense of justice in children? Infants’ 
prosocial behavior, their interest in other’s prosocial tendencies, and the capacities underlying these 
behaviors may serve as the foundation for moral thought and action, and their early emergence 
supports the view that social evaluation is a biological adaptation, not a cultural product. Prosocial 
behavior is defined as the voluntary behavior intended to benefit another (See chapter 4). There is a 
lot of evidence for the early emergence of this behavior, as well as for the fact that children are 
paying attention to differences in prosocial tendencies in others.  
The development of prosocial behavior has been studied as early as the first months of life, 
bringing extensive research on infants, this period is subject to rapid changes biologically, 
cognitively and affectively (Brownell & Carriger, 1990; Hay, Castle, Davies, Demetriou & 
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Stimson, 1999). Infants show a reactive crying in response to the cry of another child (Sagi & 
Hoffman, 1976) to bring greater distress against the tears of others with respect to their own (Dondi, 
Simion & Caltran, 1999), behavior that suggests the presence of a biological predisposition to 
experiment with rudimentary forms of empathy. In addition, children of 9 months react to the 
emotions expressed by their mothers (Termine & Izard, 1988) and use the emotional signals of the 
referents to guide their behavior in ambiguous situations (Saarni, Campos, Camras, & Witherington, 
1998). Between 12 and 18 months, children react to others' emotions clearly with positive contact 
and verbal reassurance to mothers and others (Zahn-Waxler, Robinson & Emde, 1992). Another 
prosocial behavior in early childhood is the sharing of objects as an attitude of comfort against 
another's "distress" (Hay, 1994) behavior that tends to emerge as early as 8 months (Hay & 
Rheingold, 1983).  
Killen and Smetana (2015), however, claim that the difference between sociality and 
morality is important for understanding research relevant to the origins of morality. They argue that 
all social behavior is not necessarily moral behavior; morality is more strict and requires obligations 
to behave with others a fair way. Mainly, research on the emergence of morality is based on 
cooperation and prosocial behavior. Since, these behaviors lack a prescriptive and an obligatory 
basis, it is debatable that they are genuine moral behaviors or merely positive socially oriented 
behaviors. Research for sociality in infancy is itself a broad field and covers many behaviors, for 
example, goal-intention behaviors toward others, having positive and reciprocal interactions in 
family contexts (Dunn, 2014, as cited in Killen & Smetana, 2015) and helping behaviors (Brownell, 
2013, as cited in Killen & Smetana, 2015).  
From the perspective of moral development, it is important that the early prosocial behavior 
is not only reaction to stimuli from others, but the children seem to be interested in others’ 
wellbeing as separate individuals. As soon as children start to demonstrate the ability to distinguish 
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self from others, they tend to be relatively empathetic and show prosocial behavior (Zahn-Waxler, 
Schiro, Robinson, Emde & Schmitz, 2001). Children are able to take the perspective of others in the 
second year of life, and have more mind reading abilities in children aged 4 and 5 years, and both of 
these are positively associated with an increase in prosocial behavior (Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992). In 
line with what is described above, once children reach a preschool age, the responses available to 
researchers widen to include verbal reasoning and judgments, spontaneous peer interactions, and 
responses to social dilemmas in the context of experimental situations. 
Another important aspect of prosociality, from moral point of view, is that the children also 
evaluate the prosocial behavior in others. This is important because morality does not involve only 
tendency to act in the ways we think are morally right ways to act. It also involves categorizing 
others’ behavior as morally good or bad. Hamlin, Wynn and Bloom (2007) demonstrated this kind 
of susceptibility to prosociality in 6- to 10-month-olds with a task that involved watching an 
animation showing the interaction of geometric shapes. This included a circle with eyes trying to 
climb on a hill twice without success. In one scene, the circle is being helped by a triangle to climb 
the hill, and in another scene a square hinders the circle’s attempt to go up the hill, pulling it down 
(making both triangle and square different, one acting nicely and the other one not). After observing 
these scenes, the child is asked to choose which figure they prefer between the triangle and the 
square shown in the scenes. Results show an important preference for the circle that showed 
prosocial behavior (chapter 5). 
In another experimental setting, instead of the manual choice task, the child is shown an 
animated movie scene where they see the circle that is next to the triangle or square. The results 
show that children observe the scene that violates their expectation for a longer period. This time, 
they preferred the circle approaching the triangle, which means that they choose the one who have 
helped before over the one who had hindered. There are other similar studies that use puppets 
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instead, in which infants demonstrate prosocial intentions rather than antisocial intentions by which 
puppets they reach for (see Hamlin, 2013 for a review). These prosocial orientations, as measured 
by visual preference and reaching behavior, are taken to provide evidence for an innate basis for 
morality. Research by Warneken and Tomasello (2009) reveal that 14-month-olds are willing to 
help an adult stranger to do a series of tasks when the adult seems to be distressed or confused. 
Furthermore, these behaviors are not performed simply to obtain external rewards. These findings 
provide evidence that responses to another’s concern present early in development. Research with 
older infants reveals that they evaluate moral and non-moral social interactions differently 
(Smetana, 1984), claiming that a sense of obligation should already be present at this time. 
In other studies, 18-month-olds show altruistic behavior, manifested in the form of 
instrumental help towards an individual who fails to achieve his or her aim, such as grasping a 
desired object placed out of his or her reach; interestingly, chimpanzees show similar tendencies, 
which  is evidence for the evolutionary roots of this behavior (Warneken, Hare, Melis, Hanus & 
Tomasello, 2007). This clearly demonstrates the ability to implement helping behavior directed 
towards an individual. 
Prosocial behavior is the product of the interaction between individual variables and 
contextual determinants. The individual variables include the ability to feel empathy, emotion 
management, security and a sense of personal self-efficacy, and certain personality traits. 
Contextual variables which play an important role include the cultural influences from the specific 
culture (Grusec, 1991): the social and cultural values of reference, the education given by the 
parents, especially the style of education and parental model (Grusec, 1991; Zahn-Waxler et al., 
1992), and the influence from the peer group, the education system and teaching methods related to 
the school experience (Bonino and Reffieuna, 1999). Even if it is based on an innate basis, prosocial 
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behavior, in order to develop, needs to be educated in the different contexts of life of children and 
adolescents. 
One of the more important issues concerning morality is distributive justice. It is based on 
principles such as merit, need and equality. The merit-based justice requires that resources are 
allocated according to the quantity or quality of goods and services produced by an individual’s 
productivity, commitment and competence. The justice based on need requires that resources are 
allocated according to the needs of people e.g. poverty and disadvantage. Finally, according to the 
justice based on equality (fairness), everyone should receive a resource evenly (See chapter 6).  
Damon (1988) demonstrates the influence of empathy on distributive justice; 4 year-old 
children have a strong sense of obligation to share with others in social relations and conceive 
sharing as a matter of right or wrong. The role of empathy becomes evident when children are asked 
why they share to which they respond with an emphatic justification: "So the other child is happy," 
"when I do not share anything with him, my friend is sad and wants to cry ". The non-empathic 
justifications are most frequent for a pragmatic type, like how to avoid a fight. In addition,  when 
requested to explain why stealing is bad, around half of all children between 4 and 8 years old and 
about 80% of 9 year olds respond with empathic reasons (the damage done to the victim) and not 
with the fear of punishment. 
Additionally, research on the fair allocation of resources reveals that the understanding of 
the wrongfulness of unfair allocation emerges in infancy and early childhood. Many approaches and 
methods show that children younger than the age of 6 years have already a preliminary 
understanding of the importance of distribution of resources equally or equitably (Schmidt & 
Sommerville, 2011; Sommerville, Schmidt, Yun & Burns, 2013; Geraci & Surian, 2011). The infant 
cognition research aims to determine how early in development humans can distinguish between 
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different stimuli that reflect constructs such as morality,  even if in a preliminary form. These 
studies rely on visual habituation and looking time to demonstrate preferential knowledge. In one 
such study (Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011), infants were presented with a video in which an adult 
actor (the distributor) sat at a table with two recipients, each having had a plate or glass in front of 
them. The distributor had a bowl of crackers (in one movie) or a pitcher of milk (in the second 
movie). After a black occluding screen appeared, which covered the actors’ plates and the contents 
of the bowl or pitcher. The distributor allocated the crackers or milk to each recipient; the black 
occluding screen concealed the exact amount distributed. On test trials, when the black screen was 
removed, infants saw  either equal outcomes, meaning that each actor had equal amounts of 
crackers (or milk), or unequal outcomes, meaning that one actor had more crackers (or milk) than 
the other. Infants showed a significant preference for the unequal outcome over the equal outcome, 
providing evidence that 15-month-old infants expected resources to be distributed equally to the 
recipients. In another study, 15-month-olds (Sommerville et al., 2013), with a similar procedure to 
Schmidt and Sommerville (2011) only this time without continuous resources, were presented with 
scenes in which a distributor allocated four resources between two recipients. The distributor 
divided two items between each recipient when making an equal distribution, and gave three items 
to a recipient and one item to the other when making an unequal distribution. This study showed 
further evidence that infants were attentive to the outcomes of the task showing a sensitivity 
towards an equal distribution using VOE.  
A study with 16-month-olds Geraci & Surian (2011) revealed that infants use information 
about how an agent distributes resources to guide their expectations of subsequent social 
interactions involving distributors and recipients, as well as their own preferences for different 
kinds of distributors with a manual choice task. Infants looked longer when the agent approached 
the fair distributor. In addition, when given a manual choice task, 16-month-olds selected the fair 
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distributor over the unfair one. In studies with 10-month-olds, Meristo & Surian (2013) provided 
evidence that children at this age have the capacity to evaluate agents based on their distributive 
actions. Infants looked longer when a reward was given to the unfair distributor showing a violation 
of infants’ expectations towards a fair distribution, and when antisocial actions were destined 
towards the unfair distributor rather than a fair distributor, showing that infants have an emerging 
sensitivity to fairness (Meristo & Surian, 2014). 
Furthermore, in most allocation contexts it is important to point out that many contextual 
features are activated, including social relationships, the history of interactions, and group 
dynamics. Children are not demonstrating only their moral tendencies, but these tendencies are 
mixed with other prosocial tendencies that we may not want to call moral as such. Presenting these 
features in  test settings, young children react to these social dimensions in their resource allocation 
decisions, too. Research by Olson and Spelke (2008) revealed that friendship status affected 3-year-
olds’ allocations; younger children allocated equally resources to puppet friend more often than a 
non-friend did, showing the significance of including relationship contexts and interaction features 
in this research. Morality is one aspect of social situations, and for the study of development of 
morality, it is important to see how children learn to balance between different impulses in social 
situations. Additionally, integrating social and moral reasoning may help us observe why children 
favor one type of choice over another. This, integrated study of morality and other social tendencies 
and capacities, would be a theoretically interesting direction for further study of moral development 
in children. 
My results, presented in this thesis, are adding to the growing body of evidence for 
innateness of several central moral capacities and behavioral dispositions. But my research is also 
showing some faults in some of the previous studies that have tried to demonstrate innateness. 
Another study on children’s reasoning about resource allocation tried to show that children under 6 
  
145 
 
understand equality and merit. Baumard, Mascaro, and Chevallier (2012) concluded that they have 
shown a rudimentary understanding of merit in children as young as 3-year-olds. The study initially 
focused on effort when children were given the chance to distribute a large or small cookie to a 
hard-working child or a lazy one, children were able to distribute the amount of the resource with 
greater effort. Although, in a second experiment, children preferred to distribute cookies equally 
when this option was made available. In fact, only a small minority of children explicitly used merit 
as the reason for their decision. Furthermore, as shown in chapter 6 of my thesis, we tried to carry 
out a study using a similar experimental procedure (ours with bears and acted out instead of 
vignettes), only this time we studied children of two different cultural environments (Italian and 
Colombian). We did not find that children as young as three, or up to six, of two very different 
societies are able to consider merit or also have an egalitarian choice when given the chance. Our 
conclusion from this discrepancy was that our results might be product of procedural errors. 
After this broad overview of different studies regarding moral nativism, it is time to return to 
my initial question: is morality innate? The early emergence of the evaluation of social actions, 
already in infants, suggests that this capacity cannot result entirely from experience in particular 
cultural environments (see chapter 1). This suggests that there is an innate base, which grounds 
some components of our moral cognition. My results are in agreement with the findings described 
in this chapter. They reflect various innovative research settings and methodologies that seem to 
give strong evidence for moral nativism. Research in the development of morality has provided 
theories, evidence, information that helps us understand the origins of justice, fairness, and equity in 
the early stages of development as something innate rather than acquired.  
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7.2 Limitations and Future proposals 
The previous works present some limits, of which the most important deserve to be visible 
in order to outline future proposals. 
In the first study, ‘Do infants evaluate agents’ fairness’ studying infants aged 9 and 19 
months, there were some limits. In the first place, it lacks an experiment to check the perceptual 
preference for both the agents. The results do not rule out the explanation that children can have 
preferred an agent, without the option of a resource allocation task. In second place, all agents of the 
animations were emotionless. The results do not give information if infants may have evaluated the 
behavior of others, reasoning on emotional reactions. It would be interesting to add a control 
experiment, where there are obvious emotional reactions of agents, to see if emotions can change 
the results, revealing the inference of emotions and the role of emotion in the assessments of pro-
social actions of others like. As for the procedure, it would be interesting to use a more realistic 
scenario to see if we are able to pull down the age group (Hamlin et al., 2007; Southgate et al., 
2007). For this final motive, the second study was carried out with a real life scenario displayed as a 
movie, and we had an additional measure to see infants’ violation of expectation (adding in the final 
scene 1 minute to see looking behavior).  
In the third study, we studied how infants approach fair and unfair distributors: Do they 
prefer helping a fair distributor rather than an unfair one? We tried to modify many times the 
procedure to make it attractive to infants and similar to a study conducted by Dunfield and 
Kuhlmeier (2010). In any case, we concluded that it might be distracting for children to relate to 
what was taking place on the resource allocation task, to form an evaluation on which to base their 
selectivity for a helping behavior.  
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For the fourth study,  On infants’ mapping of the word 'good' to moral qualities we added an 
older age group to see if infants’ moral competence in the domain of harm seems to be mapped at 
30 months onto an appropriate lexical item. The results reveal that when infants were explicitly 
asked to pick up the good agent, they were selectively oriented towards the helping agent.  
Finally, in the last study, ‘Do children consider merit? A cross-cultural study based on 
Colombian and Italian distributive actions’, we encountered a few procedural problems since we 
were attempting to do a similar procedure to Baumard et al. (2012), with the same aim (see chapter 
6). 
Future proposals allow us to continue the purpose of this work, in order to investigate the 
origins and the cognitive development of morality.  
7.3 Final Remarks 
Justice, fairness, and equity seem to be specific to morality, not general to all social 
cognition. Children are using moral cognition in situations that involve other considerations, too, 
but the moral capacities themselves are for no other purposes. This means that these capacities and 
tendencies are both innate and specifically moral. Thus, morality is innate. In addition to being in 
agreement with the previous studies that point to nativism, my results are adding new evidence 
confirming the hypothesis that morality, or central parts of the moral cognition at least, are indeed 
innate.  
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